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FOREWORD 
T HIS pamphlet, dealing primarily with the underground opposition to Hitler's regime in Germany but also giving a valuable account of the defects and mistakes 
in the labor movement which led to Hitler's triumph, is of 
great value to all enemies of fascism. 
It is valuable first of all because of the detailed and ac-
curate social history of Germany which it presents. Here, in 
brief compass one may see the rise of Hitler and all the tragic 
mistakes of conservatives and radicals which contributed to 
his ultimate triumph. Its primary purpose is, however, to 
record the heroic struggle which is being made in a totali-
tarian state by the remnants of a once powerful labour move-
ment. Whether this struggle, in which the ingenuity and 
bravery of a valiant minority partially atones for the mis-
takes of the past, will contribute to the ultimate destruction 
of fascism, only future history can tell. But when fascism is 
destroyed as ultimately it must be, one can not help but be-
lieve that the organizational and educational work, which is 
now carried on at so great a risk, is bound to make great con-
tributions to the formation of a new society. 
All this is important and interesting simply as history. It 
is good to know with what courage some men stand out against· 
malignant power. But this pamphlet is of greater importance 
as a warning and guidepost for the labor forces in all parts 
of the world where democracy still exists, though every-
where threatened by fascistic tendencies. It warns us for 
one thing how terribly dangerous and fatal a division in the 
ranks of labor is, a warning which has achieved particular 
relevance in our own country with its unhappy rift in the 
organized labor movement. It warns us also against allow-
ing fascism a fonthold anywhere, under the mistaken hope 
that it will destroy itself. Fascism will undoubtedly destroy 
itself in the end; but not without taking whole civilizations 
to disaster in its destruction. Thus the mistakes of the labor 
forces hefore the advent of fascism are a warning, and the 
heroism nf the underground movement after fascism's rise 
to power is an inspiring fact. Weare warned and inspired. 
We are warned against mistakes which lead to such fatal con-
sequences and. inspired to carry forward the fight against 
fascism with a courage at least slightly commensurate with 
the courage of those who must contend against it-after all the 
instruments of power and nppression are in its hands. 
REINHOLD NIEBUHR 
The Underground Struggle III Germang 
By EVELYN LEND 
1. The Background 
W HEN Hitler formed his first coalition government in J anu-ary, 1933, the whole world looked at Germany querying: Wha t would the German opposition do? How would the 
German working class react ? Would Socialists and Communists com-
bine forces in the eleventh hour, call a general strike, rise against 
the newly-appointed "leader"? 
N one of these things happene~. Blow after blow was dealt to the 
German labor movement, provoking no visible resistance. And when, 
after a few months, nothing seemed to be left of the once so proud 
and powerful German working class organizations, the collapse was 
generally accepted as one of the many events in world history after 
1914 which were as tragic as they were incomprehensible. 
If we measure the trends of general opinion by the yardstick of 
election figures, it is evident that the most rapid advancement of the 
Nazis took place in the period between 1928 and 1930. Previous to 
1928 Hitler was generally regarded as an absurd and trouble-making 
agitator who, together with his followers, constituted a menace to the 
democratic Republic no greater than any gang of irresponsihle crim-
inals. In the general elections of May, 1928, the Nazis secured no 
more than 12 seats in Parliament as against 152 Social Democrats, 
54 Communists, 78 Catholics, 45 Conservatives (Deutsche Volks-
partei), 78 German Nationalists (Diehard Tories), and 25 Liherals. 
Compared with the previous elections (in 192~), the Nazis had ac-
tually lost two seats; all bourgeois parties lost heavily, the German 
Nationalists as many as 33 seats. The only clear winners in the 1928 
elections were the so-called Marxist parties, the Socialists gaining 
21 and the Communists gaining 9 seats. 
Within the short period of rather more than two years which fol-
lowed, the Nazis increased their influence so enormously that, in the 
next elections (September 1930) they gained as many as 107 seats in 
the Reichstag or six and a half million votes against the 800,000 
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votes which they got in 1928. The only other party to make headway 
in the 1930 elections were the Communists. They gained 1% mil-
lion votes whereas the Socialists lost half a million. The N,azi gains 
were therefore not won at the expense of the working-class parties, 
but comprised such votes as had previously been cast for the N a-
tionalist and Conservative parties plus about four million new votes 
cast by electors whom Hitler had attracted to the polls for the first 
time. What had happened in those two years that resulted in this 
unique rise of the Nazis? 
To convey the full meaning of the collapse of German democ-
racy one would need a detailed analysis of the character of the revo-
lution in 1918 and the nature of the republic which emerged from it. 
This cannot be made here. Le.t me instead briefly recall those factors 
which had the most important bearing on the situation after 1928: 
The Social Democrats forfeited the power which had been given 
into their hands by the breakdown of the imperial army and civil 
administration. Although a · democratic constitution had been intro-
duced, distinguished by its far-reaching social legislation, the strong-
holds of reaction were not even touched. The Prussian Jwnkers 
(landed aristocracy), the all-powerful capitalist trusts (especially in 
heavy industry), the personnel of the army and civil administration, 
the diplomatic corps, the judges and public prosecutors, all of them 
educated in the spirit of imperial pre-war Germany, continued to 
function unhampered by the young republic. The title of a book by 
Th. Plivier, dealing with the 1918 revolution, gives the essence of the 
situation in one short sentence: "The Kaiser went, the Generals re-
mained." 
Until the end of the year 1923 a number of attempts to overthrow 
the Weimar republic were made by the revolutionary Left as well as 
by the counter-revolutionary Right. They all failed, adding merely 
to the general chaos which resulted from the war, the devastating in-
flation, reparations, and the occupation of the Ruhr district. 
In the years between 1924 and 1928 it seemed that stability and 
calm had returned at last. American capital was pouring into Ger-
many, assisting the rapid reconstruction of Germany industry. In 
1926 Germany was solemnly admitted to the League of Nations after 
having concluded the Locarno Treaty for peace and security with 
Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy in October, 1925. During 
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that period the standard of living was nSlng; unemployment was 
compara tively low; the trade unions were successful in raising wages; 
the--frequently Socialist-municipalities were actively engaged in 
an immense progral!l for building decent working class flats. The war, 
the Versailles Treaty, the inflation were almost forgotten-Germany 
lived at peace with herself and with the world. 
The consequence of this restoration of calm and prosperity was 
the same as it would be anywhere in the world-conservatism. If con-
servatism means being in favor of existing conditions and institutions, 
the truly conservative forces at that time in Germany were the Social 
Democrats who had been mainly responsible for the Weimar consti-
tution and continued to be its principal advocates. Nowhere was this 
more clearly expressed than in a book written by the veteran Austro-
German Socialist Karl Kautsky: "The political tasks of the prole-
tarian parties have been radically transformed by the revolution 
(i.e. of 1918) and its consequences .... Our function is now to main-
tain the republic, i.e., the existing state, and not to overthrow it; in 
so far Social Democracy ceases to be revolutionary and becomes con-
servative .... Thus the idea of a political revolution after the political 
revolution becomes nonsensica1." (Karl Kautsky: "Der Bolschewis-
mus in der Sackgasse," 1930). 
Hence the extraordinarily high vote which the Social Democrats 
gained in 1928 (nine millions). Th~ Communists, too, made some gains 
a ttracting altogether 31;2 million electors. At first sight the Com-
munist success would appear to contradict the above statement of an 
essentially conservative victory, but during the period in question 
Communist policy was in fact not so funda·mentally different from 
that of the Social Democrats. The "left" Communist leaders having 
been expelled, the party worked side hy side with the Socialists in 
the free trade unions for the improvement of labor conditions. They 
never forsook their revolutionary aims; but somehow the goal of revo-
lution seemed to have moved into the same far distance as the Socialist 
commonwealth of which Social Democrats still sometimes dreamed. 
In the two years which followed the German situation was to change 
so radically in every respect that few were quick enough to grasp the 
full significance of the transformation. 
The main factor responsible for the change was the deep eco-
nomic slump into which the country was plunged after only four 
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short years of reconstruction and prosperity. Unemployment figures 
rose as fast as wages fell, and with the growing misery of the work-
ing class, and through the rapid decline of their purchasing power, 
hundreds of thousands of small shopkeepers, trad~smen, artisans, and 
peasants were ruined. The deepness of the slump would have been a 
catastrophe for any country. But in Germany, which since 1914 had 
known little but hardship and starvation, the crisis had a much deeper 
effect. There had been altogether too much misery; too long had the 
pa tience of the German people been tried; now it turned to despera-
tion. They were looking for help, but to whom should they appeal? 
The old reactionary parties had brought upon them the misery of the 
war. Besides, their leaders were the same bosses who now threw the 
workers into the street or cut their wages ruthlessly. They could be 
counted out. The Social Democrats? But the Social Democrats seemed 
responsible for it all. In 1928 a coalition government had been formed 
under Social Democratic leadership. The Social Democrat Hermann 
Mueller-Franken was Prime Minister. The slump had started with the 
Socialists in office. Perhaps-many people thought-the slump was 
not directly due to them, but they had clearly been incapable of 
dealing with it. 
The terrible crisis suddenly awakened radical feelings in the Ger-
man people. Their radicalism was vague in its content. They did not 
know what they wanted or what could or should be done. They merely 
k.new that everything ought to be radically different. The tide could 
have been turned then if only , at tha t late hour, Socialists and Com-
munists had combined forces, determined to shift the burden of the 
slump from the shoulders of the poor on to the shoulders of the rich, 
unafraid of possible implications and consequences. But, as it turned 
out, the period of growing misery coincided with an increasingly in-
tensified fraternal strife between the two working class parties. 
In the same year of 1928 the Sixth World Congress of the Com- . 
intern met, and inaugurated its new policy which was to be fol-
lowed by all the Communist parties of the world. Part of it was the 
theory of "Social-Fascism," i.e., that Social Democracy was the 
chief enemy of the working class; the tactics, which went with it, were 
the splitting of the free trade unions and the refusal to collaborate 
with other working class parties. 
The intensity of the mutual hatred of Socialists and Communists 
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will hardly be conceivable to anyone who has not himself experienced 
this period. To both of them the enemy was not so much the rising 
Fascist movement, the Junkers or magnates of the Ruhr, as the rival 
labor organization, which was to be attacked on every .occasion with 
the utmost ferocity. In the course of time more and more Socialist 
parties and organizations, varying in size and importance, were to 
join in the general competition for the support of the German work-
ers. There was, to begin with, the ISK (Ge:man section of the Militant 
Socialist International) which was founded in 1926 after its members 
had been expelled from the Social Democrats. This organization 
fought particularly against the idea that Socialism must inevitably 
succeed capitalism. In theory as well as in practice its chief charac-
teristic was the emphasis laid on moral integrity and education of 
character of the individual members. Endeavoring to combine dis-
ciplined action with freedom of criticism, they formed a centralized 
cadre-organization with a strict code of rules (e.g., teetotalism, sev-
erance of all connections with religious communities, etc.). Then there 
was the K.P.O. (Communist Party, Opposition) which broke away 
from the German C.P. after the Sixth World Congress of the Com-
intern. That break-away was due primarily to their disagreement with 
the new policy of the C.P., which demanded the formation of inde-
pendent Communist trade unions and rendered co-operation with 
other working class parties impossible. There was later the S.A.P. 
(Socialist Workers' Party), in many respects the equivalent of the 
I.L.P., which had emerged partly from the Left wing of the Social 
Democrats and partly from the K.P.O. Apart from these, there arose 
numerous other small groups and organizations, too insignificant to 
be mentioned by name. 
While the crisis grew worse, the radicalism of which I have spoken 
increased, and with it a general tension leading to frequent bitter 
clashes between political opponents which, as often as not, ended in 
armed battles. As an answer to the general tension, the Social Demo-
cratic Police President of Berlin, Herr Zorgiebel, prohibited all open 
air demonstrations for May Day, 1929. It was to be foreseen that 
the radical Bedin workers would not easily renounce their May 
Day demonstration for which they had fought in the past against the 
laws of Bismarck and the Kaiser. Despite the prohibition, many fol-
lowed the call of the Communists and went out into the street. The 
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police force, controlled by the Social Democrats (and commanded by 
many reactionary officers of the old school), was sent out fully 
equipped with tanks, machine guns, and rifles, and with strict orders 
to enforce th~ law at any cost. The result was 25 workers killed, 36 
heavily wounded, and numerous others slightly injured. This May 
Day has never been forgotten in Berlin. It was probably largely re-
sponsible for the gains which the Communists made in the general elec-
tions of 1930 at the expense of the Social Democrats. 
The decisive swing-over, however, took place not within the camp 
of the organized working class, but within the very much larger sec-
tion of the German people which had previously been more or less 
indifferent. This was the essentially passive element in politics which, 
lacking any definite aims or consistent policy of its own, moves in-
variably with the general tide, attracted always by the strongest 
force. A united and militant working-class would have attracted 
them. A working class, split into rival organizations each condemning 
and denouncing the other, was the embodiment of hopeless impotence. 
Hence the sudden rise of the Hitler Party from practically nought 
to the second strongest party in the Reichstag. The Nazis were able 
to reap the harvest sown by the economic slump and the incapacity 
of labor to deal with it. The German people had reached such depths 
of misery that their hopes were replaced by fury: "Give us a scape-
goat," they demanded, "give us those who are responsible, tell us who 
our enemy is so that we can take revenge." The Nazis were obliging. 
To the desperate people they gave the anonymous enemy: "The Sys-
tem." A more effective slogan has never been invented. "The System" 
of 1918 was everything that was evil and hateful. And the people 
swallowed the new catchword greedily. Bigger and bigger grew the 
audiences to whom Hitler threw the foe: "The System," embodying 
the slump, unemployment, and "interest-slavery," the dominance of 
the Jews, the dominance of Bolshevism, the dominance of finance cap-
ital, ruination of the small shopkeepers by department- and chain-
stores, the heavy liabilities of landlords and peasants, the sinking 
profits of industry, and-.-above all-the country's national enslave-
ment through the Versailles Treaty; in short, every. grievance which 
anyone might conceivably have. 
Hitler did not propose any specific cure to heal all the thousand 
wounds from which the German people was bleeding. He simply said: 
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"Give me the power, and I will do everythi~g for you." It sounded in-
credible and still, what else was there to hope for. The Nazis had never 
failed as yet-because th~y had never been tried out. They seemed a 
strong and disciplined body with one central will, strikingly different 
from all the other parties, disunited in thei~ own ranks through quar-
reling and strife. 
Hitler gave Germany an enemy-"The System." He gave her also 
a cause-Nationalism. There can be no doubt as to the wrongs that 
Germany experienced from her conquerors in the immediate post-war 
period; it is equally true, however, that international readjustment 
was well on its way. The national indignation against the Ruhr occu-
pation in 1923 had been a genuine feeling shared by the entire Ger-
man people. But the jingoist frenzy whipped up by Nazi agitation 
after 1929 had little or no,thing to do with the real German grievances. 
No German felt friendly towards the Versailles treaty, but neither 
was this treaty and its implications the subject of universal concern 
and hatred before the Nazis used it as their chief scape-goat. "The 
System" and the "Versailles Dictate" became much more symbols than 
tangible realities. The average German did not know exactly what the 
Versailles treaty was all about, he understood it just as little as the 
working of that devilish trinity that was alleged to rule over the coun-
try-Judaism, Bolshevism, and Finance capital, all in one person. 
Yet lack of consistency and logic did not prevent the Nazis from 
winning millions of desperate souls. They won, in the course of time, 
their adherents from all classes of society. And in all classes their ap-
peal was successful with precisely the same type of people. In the 
working class Hitler found his followers among the permanently un-
employed, i.e., those workers who had already lost all reasonable hope 
of ever finding jobs in the normal course of economic development. 
They were the victims not so much of the recent slump (which had 
merely turned their despair into desperateness), as of industrial ra-
tionalization which had substituted machinery for human labor. 
Among the urban lower middle classes Hitler attracted all those mil-
lions of small traders, shop-keepers, and artisans who had been crowd-
ed out of their trades by the modern development of production and 
distribution. Among the peasants and big landowners the Nazi sup-
porters were those most hopelessly in debt through the international 
agrarian crisis. Last, but not least, there was a large and important 
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section of the capitalist class which, right from the beginning, had 
cast in its lot with Hitler. Outstanding among them were the well-
known leaders of German heavy industry who were on the very verge 
of bankruptcy. 
In other words, the Fascist recruits comprised the bankrupt peo-
ple of all classes, those who could no longer hope to help themselves, 
those who had been thrown out of their traditional position in society 
without a chance of regaining it. They could see but one way out-
a strong state which would create work for the unemployed, subsidize 
industry and landed interests-do for them, in short, what they could 
not do themselves. Their man was Hitler, their party Fascism, setting 
out to merge the ideals of capitalism with those of feudalism, guaran-
teeing profits to industry, work to the workers, rent to the landlords, 
protective guilds to the craftsmen, power to the army, and glory to 
them all. Thus Hitler scored his amazing success in 1930, thus he over-
took all other forces within the next three years, emerging then as 
the supreme ruler of Germany. 
After the September elections in 1930 the slump grew even worse. 
The Socialists had been forced to resign previous to the elections. 
Bruening followed Hermann Mueller as Chancellor of the Reich. His 
rule by emergency decrees heralded the beginning of the end of the 
Weimar constitution. While enormous sums from public funds were 
given as credits to the estates of Hindenburg's friends, the East 
Prussian Junkers, wages and unemployment benefits were ruthlessly 
cut; new general taxes were introduced, imposing an equal burden on 
rich and poor, in short, a redistribution of the shrinking wealth in 
favor of the possessing classes . 
• Still, the Social Democrats tolerated Bruening and his policy of 
emergency decrees, holding that-bad as Bruening was-he was the 
lesser evil compared with what might come after him. The Commu-
nists attacked the Social Democrats violently because of their theory 
of the lesser evil and their unpopular toleration policy, arguing that 
starva tion under Bruening was no better than starvation under Hit-
ler. While this criticism was regarded with much sympathy by a large 
section of the Socialist and trade union rank and file membership, the 
Communist policy of calling practically all non-Communists fascist 
was vehemently rejected. In the eyes of the C.P. the Bruening Gov-
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ernment was "Fascist," the Social Democratic Party was "Fascist," 
why should they be afraid of Hitler? As a matter of fact, they even 
regarded a Hitler victory as a vehicle of hastening the revolution. In 
a parliamentary speech, on October 14, 1931, Remmele (then one of 
the leaders of the German C.P. second only to Thaelmann) said: 
"Herr Bruening has expressed it very clearly: Dnce they (i.e. the 
Fascists) are in Po.wer, then the united front Df the proletariat will 
emerge and it will make a clean sweep of everything .... Weare not 
afraid Df the Fascists. They will shoot their bolt sooner than any 
other Government." That was the Communist line of thought right 
up to' 1932. "Let the Nazis come, they will provoke the revolution." 
In their blindness to the real development they not only considered 
the Fascist dictatorship a better means than democracy of serving 
their own ends, but they even strengthened the jingoist appeal of the 
Nazis by launching suddenly a program of "National and Social Lib-
eration," by denouncing the Nazis for waging a mere sham-fight 
against the "Versailles Slavery," whereas they, the Communists, were 
the true defenders of national freedom, and by participating actively 
in a Nazi referendum against the Social Democratic government of 
Prussia in August, 1931. 
By the beginning of the year 1932 they changed their line. The 
Nazi menace had become too threatening. The hopes for a revolution-
ary opportunity as a consequence of a Nazi victo.ry had become too 
obviously absurd. The C.P. launched another campaign under the 
slogan: "Fight Fascism Now." But nobody s~emed to know exactly 
where and what Fascism was. Both the Socialists and the Bruening 
Government had been denounced as Fascists. Yet Bruening had to 
make room for the more Fascist von Papen government. And when 
von Papen dismissed the Social Democratic government of Prussia, the 
Communists made suddenly a united front proposal to. the Social 
Democrats and trade unions. They suggested a general strike against 
von Papen's coup d'etat in Prussia and in defence of the same Braun-
Severing government which they had tried to' overthrow only eleven 
months ago by supporting the Nazi referendum. The general strike 
did not come off for two reasons of equal importance. On the one hand 
the Communist united front proposals were too sudden to be taken 
seriously anywhere. On the -other hand the Socialists had grown so 
accustomed to tolerating every blow as part of the lesser evil that 
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they refused to take action when Prussia, their last governmental 
stronghold, was taken from them. 
Papen's coup in Prussia took place on July 20, 1932. A few days 
later, on July 31, there were again general elections. This time Hitler 
gained 230 seats out of a total of 607. The Social Democrats had 
133, the Communists 89 seats. The newly elected Reichstag was dis-
solved at its first meeting. Another election followed in N ovemher. 
This time the Nazis suffered a serious set-back, losing two million 
votes which were, for the last time, re-captured by the German N a-
tionalists. The Social Democratic vote fell further, the Communists 
gained what they lost. Hitler's los'ses were generally regarded as the 
beginning of his definite decline. In reality, he had forfeited merely 
temporarily the support of some middle class sections, which had be-
come frightened by the radical language of the Nazis and their active 
participation in the Berlin transport workers' strike, called by the 
Communists on the eve of the elections. The trade unions refused to 
sanction the strike and pay relief. But in spite of its unofficial char-
acter it was at first very successful and paralyzed Berlin's transpor-
tation completely. The response of the transport workers was very 
vigorous; practically all of them came out and they found wide-
spread sympathy among the Berlin population. But, unaided as it 
was by the trade unions, the strike was bound to break down. The 
trade union bureaucracy refused to sanction the strike, and it took 
a very strange development. Street collections were taken for the 
strike funds, and I shall always remember the sight of a Communist , 
and a Nazi standing arm in arm and shouting in an agreed rhythm, 
while they were shaking their collection boxes: "For the strike funds 
of the R.G.O. (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition)"- "For the 
strike funds of the N.S.B.O. (Nazi Factory Cell Organization)." The 
sight of this perverted united front, observed in various districts of 
Berlin, was so repulsive to most Socialists that they lost all the sym-
pathy for the strike they previously had. 
After the November elections Hitler was asked to join the Papen 
cabinet. He refused, demanding either complete power or nothing. 
As von Papen was unable to obtain a parliamentary majority, he was 
followed by General von Schleicher who, on December 2, accepted the 
task of forming the new government. The following months of D'e-
cember and January were one long chain of manoeuvres and intrigues 
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between Papen, Hitler, the Hindenburg clique and Hugenberg (the 
leader of the German Nationalists and boss of the powerful 
ScherZ newspaper concern), in order to undermine Schleicher's posi-
tion. On January 28, 1933, Schleicher resigned. On January 30, 
Hindenburg finally yielded to the Nazi terms. 
Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the Reich. 
2. Breakdown of the Labor Movement 
(January, 1933--Autumn, 1933) 
T HE first phase of Fascist rule over Germany is essentially the period of piecemeal destruction as well as of the break-down of the traditional working-class movement. This phase began 
with the advent to power of Hitler's so-called National Coalition--
the government was at first not exclusively Nazi-in January, 1933, 
and lasted to the plebiscite in November of the same year. Let me 
briefly recall the main facts. 
Obvious as it is now that January 30, 1933, was the first day of 
totalitarian Nazi rule over Germany, it is important to remember 
that then the labor movement in no way comprehended what was really 
happening. Although persecution of labor officials and members start-
ed immediately on a big scale, few appreciated that it was the begin-
ning of the end. 
Two facts above all accounted for this strange lack of apprehen-
sion: 
(1) The intense civil war atmosphere that had preceded the Hitler 
government. Terror was . in no way ~n altogether new phenom'enon. 
Armed raids of Nazi formations on political meetings of opponents 
or on workers' settlements had become almost a daily feature during 
the years of the big slump. Every Sunday night, when the first edi-
tions of the l\tlonday papers were sold in the streets of Berlin, the first 
thing one used to do was to turn almost mechanically to the account 
of the deaths which had occurred during the week-end as a result of 
. Nazi assaults on political opponents. One grew accustomed to read 
of an average of half a dozen per week in many districts, much as 
one read of road accidents. Of course, onc.e Hitler had become Chan-
cellor the terror increased immediately on an enormous scale. How-
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ever, it increased and was not an altogether new and hitherto un-
known thing, and therefore appeared at first to be a mere change in 
quantity. 
(2) The second important factor was that Hitler came to power 
with a coalition government apparently of a similar type to those 
Germany had known in the past. The preceding coalition governments 
of Bruening, Papen, and Schleicher had already been so reactionary 
and had to such a large extent based their reign on emergency decrees 
and unconstitutional procedure. that the fundamental novelty of the 
Nazi government was at first hardly visible. If, in addition, one bears 
in mind that the previous governments had been denounced-. particu-
larly though not exclusively by the Communist propaganda-as g-.Em-
uine Fascist governments, the lack of appreciation becomes more 
comprehensible. 
On February 1 Parliament was dissolved. The same day Goering 
issued a decree against Communist propaganda. On February 4 the 
President of the Reich, Hindenburg, issued an emergency decree "For 
the protection of the German people" which was directed against all 
anti-N azi forces. On. Feb. 7 Goering appointed National Socialist 
officials to the Ministry of Interior. On Feb. 9 all police officers, who 
did not wholeheartedly support Hitler, were asked to resign from their 
posts. On Feb. 13 all republican civil servants in high positions were 
dismissed. On Feb. 15 Nazis were appointed as police officers in place 
of such republicans as had been forced to resign. On Feb. 17 the 
terror was officially sanctioned by an order to the police force to use 
their firearms against the population. 
In the meantime, almost the entire Communist and Socialist press 
had been suppressed, some papers for good, some for three months, 
others only for days. After such a period they were again allowed to 
appear for a couple of days in order to be ,suppressed anew. Thus the 
labor moveme~t was robbed of all its propaganda means for the 
forthcoming elections on March 5. Apart from their press most of 
their literature and their meetings were banned. 
Still, the continuity of the rule of law was seriously doubted by 
nobody. That was particularly true of the Social Democrats. I well 
remember the last meeting which the Socialists were allowed to hold 
in the Berlin Lustgarten. At that meeting Otto Wels, Chairman of 
the Social Democratic Party, characterized the situation by the com-
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fDrting prDverb: "Strict masters dO' nDt rule fDr a long time." Even 
the large-scale Nazi prDvDcatiDn Df February 27, the burning Df the 
Reichstag, did nDt succeed in completely destrDying the stubborn 
wishful belief that after a while things wDuld return to' their nDrmal 
CDurse. 
Whilst this was the average view Df the SDcialists and trade union-
ists, the CDmmunists were in nO' way mDre realistic. The twO' wings 
of the movement differed Dnly in that the SDcialists held that things 
could nDt really develop as badly as SDme iSDlated pessimists pre-
dicted, whereas the CDmmunists acted as if things had already becDme 
SO' bad (under the previDus gDvernments) that it was lDgically im-
pDssible for them to' becDme WDrse. 
The first terrDr wave was particularly, thDugh nDt exclusively, 
directed against the CDmmunists. The CDmmunist Party was pro-
hibited on the day Df the Reichstag fire (which gave the excuse). Dur-
ing the next few days thousands, if nDt tens Df thDusands Df their 
parliamentary deputies, party Dfficers, and active members were 
thrown intO' the prisDns Dr murdered. In the CDurse Df the next few 
mDnths, the S Jcialists were to' experience exactly the same fate. But 
they were given a shDrt space Df time, during which their party Dr-
ganization was allDwed to' cDntinue a sham legal existence Dnly hamp-
ered by SDme "trifling" restrictions; fDr example, their press was 
prDhibited, their meetings were dissolved or raided, their electiDn 
pDsters tDrn frDm the walls, their party and trade uniDn Dffices ran-
sacked. 
The general electiDns Df March 5, in spite Df the previDus wave 
of terrDr against all DrganizatiDns Dn the left, still gave as many as 
120 parliamentary seats to' SDcialists and 81 to' the CDmmunists 
(against 288 Nazis, 73 CathDlic-Centre, and 52 N atiDnalists). 'The 
CDmmunist vDtes being cancelled, tI le Nazis cDuld claim an absDlute 
majDrity. 
Even the eventful mDnth Df February, 1933, was nDt impressive 
enough to' Dpen the eyes of the German wDrkers, whO' watched and 
suffered their terrible fate in a hDrrified bewilderment that was mDre 
paralyzing than calling fDr actiDn. They were just waiting. Waiting 
to' awake frDm a bad dream Dr waiting fDr a lead fDr actiDn which 
never came, neither from the Socialists, nDr from the Communists. 
The SDcialists went Dn prO' claiming that "we must wage our strug-
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gle on the basis of the constitution" (which for all practical purposes 
had been abolished long since) ; and they emphasized that "undis-
ciplined procedure by individual organizations or groups on their 
own initiative would do the greatest harm to. the entire working 
class" (from the Manifesto, issued by the Executive and Parlia-
mentary Party of the Social Democrats. Vorwaerts, January 31, 
.] 933.) That call for discipline remained their only message to the 
workers, who awaited a call for action. Previously, the same Vor-
waerts had spoken of "fierce resistance," but that resistance was only 
remembered when it was too late. 
The Communists had used even stronger language, but the show 
they gave was as poor. Later they argued that the betrayal of the 
Social Democrats had rendered any action impossible. With them-
selves, they were quite satisfied; apparently the lack of resistance 
did not mean anything, as "the force of the C.P. expressed itself in 
the fact that, in the critical moment, the party remained homogen-
eous. During the critical weeks, there were no discussions going on 
in the German C.P." (The Commwnist International, German edition, 
No. 10; July 7,1933.) 
As a result of such a situation, the political and orgam:iz.ational 
life of the working class was more and more subject either to sudden 
or to gradual disruption. By the early days of spring, contacts be-
tween the Central Executives of both the Communist and the Social 
Democratic Party with the local and district organizations had 
broken off. The rank and file members in vain sought guidance from 
their former leaders. All they got, was either examples of retreat 
or else phrases that had no bearing on the situation. 
Deceived by the fact that the Nazis advanced only step by step 
and did not destroy all democratic institutions at one blow (although 
achieving in a few months the same results for which the Italians had 
needed as many years), 'the Social Democrats believed up to the very 
last minute that they might he able to save their party from illegality. 
Consequently, they concentrated all their energies on that one goal: 
to preserve the party and its legal status at all costs .They went very 
far to achieve this end, as the following examples show. The So-
cialist and liberal press of other countries had published full accounts 
of the atrocities committed by the German Fascists. During the lBtSt 
days of March, several members -of the Socialist Party Executive 
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were sent abroad in order to stop these reports which "were apt to 
harm the position of anti-Fascists in Germany" who had been held 
responsible by the Nazis for furnishing the details. On March 30, 
Otto Wels, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, demonstra-
tively resigned from the Bureau of the Second International. Wels 
later explanation that this resignation was but a tactical move and 
that he had never really contemplated giving up his and his party's 
international affiliation is very likely correct. However, the attempts 
of the Social Democratic Party to adapt themselves, if only outward-
ly, to the new German spirit of narrow nationalism, certainly played 
into the hands of the Nazis. The demonstrative abandonment of work-
ing class internationalism added considerably to the already existing 
demoraliza tion. 
Nothing, neither concession nor compromise, could save the labor 
organizations from their fate. Bit by bit, their legal existence was 
destroyed. The worst attempt at a voluntary self-adaptation to the 
regime was made by the A.D.G.B. (the German central labor federa-
tion), which went as far as to support warmly the F8.lscist May Day 
celebra tions. The Gewerkschaftszeitung, the official organ of the 
A.D.G.B. published for Mayan article by Walter Pahl of which one 
paragraph reads: "We certainly need not strike our colors in order 
to recognize that the victory of National Socialism, though won in 
the struggle against a party which we used to consider as the embodi-
ment of the idea of Socialism (i.e. the Social D'emocrats), is oor 
victory as weU; because, today, the Socialist task is put to the whole 
nation." (My italics.) This declaration, which roused much indig-
na tion among the rank and file of the trade union and Socialist move-
ment, failed to impress the Nazis in the least. On May 2, a few days 
after that surrender, all trade union buildings were occupied by the 
S. A. (Storm troopers) and S.S. (Blackshirts). The most prominent 
trade union leaders were arrested (Leipart, Grassmann and Wissel). 
On May 13, all trade union property was confiscated. The German 
working class had lost its industrial organizations. The only union 
to escape the enforced Gleichschalt'UlTlg, (incorporation into the new 
system) was the AFA-Bund (Employees' Union, embracing clerks, 
s'hop assistants and other categories of white collar workers), which 
dissolved itself voluntarily in order to spare its members the shame-
ful subjection. 
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In the meantime, the Social Democrats split into several groups. 
A part of the Executive emigrated to Prague and continued from 
there their activities. The largest section of the Parliamentary Party 
led by Paul Loebe (President of the German Reichstag), went fur-
ther and further in their concessions in order to buy from Hitler the 
tolera tion of the party. 
A third part, finally, worked clandestinely. Of them I shall speak 
later. 
On May 17, Hitler made in the Reichstag one of his famous speeches 
on the question of foreign policy. That was the last Parliamentary 
session in which the Socialists were to participate. The last act they 
performed as a legal political party was to support the Nazi resolu-
tion on foreign policy which was thus unanimously accepted. That 
surrender helped them, howe<ver, as little as submission had been able 
to save the trade unions. On June 23, the Social Democratic Party 
was officially prohibited; the leader of the concession policy, Paul 
Loebe, was arrested together with many others. The Nazi regime had 
tolerated Loebe's line of compromise exactly as long as they con-
sidered it useful for their own ends, that is to say, until the confusion 
of the working masses was carried so far that the last spark of self-
confidence was suffocated. 
On July 14, this development found its temporary end by the "Bill 
Against The New Formation Of Parties," which declared the Nazis 
the only legal political pq.rty in Germany. 
Thus, in less than four months the powerful German labor move-
ment organized and trained for many years, educated by Marx and 
Engels, proud of its traditions and achievements, that movement 
burst like a huge toy balloon pricked by a needle. The totalitarian 
state was established. The working class movement had vanished from 
the surface. Socialists in other countries may have pitied their un-
happy German comrades. But, in their eyes, the German movement 
was finished, and, as many felt, largely through its own fault. 
The disappointment can nowhere have been greater than among 
the German workers themselves. They understood as little as t.heir 
friends abroad. They despised themselves and their defeated organiza-
tion as much as only their worst enemies could. Worst of all, even 
then the responsible parties did not try to understand what had ha p-
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pened and to seek new ways which might assist in the reorganization 
of the beaten labor army. They refused to realize what had happened 
and buried their heads in the sand in the ostrich manner. 
At the time of the worst defeat when everybody was wondering: 
How could this have happened, what was responsible, what are we 
to do now? the Communists continued their old methods of self-de-
lusion which had been largely responsible for the breakdown: "Every-
thing points to this: that in the very near future violent class strug-
gles must be expected ... 0 Will the Party (i.e., the C.P.) be able 
to give a sufficient lead to the present revolutionary movement of the 
masses?" They go on to speak of "the expression of the increasing 
revolutionary activities of the masses," etc., etc. ("A few remarks 
on the illegal activities of the C.P.G." The Commumst International, 
German Edition, No. 14, September 1, 1933.) At the same time the 
Communists continued to direct their main attacks against the So-
cialists. It is true, the exit of the Social Democratic Party and the 
trade unions was bad enough. However, the attempts at making 
themselves acceptable to the Nazis was mainly the work of a few, 
though prominent, individuals. The Communists must have known that 
as well as anybody else. That did not prevent them from claiming 
that "the complete elimination of the Social Fascists (i.e., the Social 
Democrats) from the state apparatus, the brutal suppression of the 
Social Democratic organization and its press as well does not alter 
the fact that they (i.e., the suppressed party and its no longer exist-
ing press) represent now as before the main social buttress of the 
dictatorship of capital." (Fritz Heckert, member of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Germany: "About the fight 
of the Communist Party in Germany." Rwndschau, No. 23; July 7, 
1933). 
The Socialists were just as eager to attribute all the responsibility 
for the defeat to the Communists: "The fact remains that Commu-
nism has been one long crime and a terrible fate for the German 
working class. Communism paralyzes the parliamentary influence of 
the labor movement ... thus Social Democracy was defeated and 
with it the Republic and the working class was defeated by the as-
saulting counter-revolutionary forces .... " ("Break the Chains," 
Neuer Vorwaerts, Prague, No.1; June 18,1933.) 
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Let me once more shortly recall the main facts which at that time 
impressed themselves most on everybody's mind: 
(1) Big promises about "the determination to offer fierce resist-
ance," made before Hitler came to power, had turned out to be so 
many hollow wo.rds and phrases. 
(2) All better known working class leaders-with hardly any ex-
ception-had disappeared in one way or other. Together with them 
disappeared their offices, their funds, their press, in other words', all 
those functions; activities, and material holdings which transforms a 
group of people into an organization. 
(3) The trade unions and a certain part of the Parliamentary 
Socialist Party had, up to the last moment, tried to sell themselves 
to Hitler-and even failed to save themselves. 
(4) The Communists blinded themselves to reality, maintaining 
that the defeat was actually a revolutionary advance, and that the 
Socialists continued to be the chief and most dangerous enemies. 
At the same time Hiller spoke golden words. He had asked for four 
years in which to overcome economic misery, abolish unemployment 
and restore "German honor." Had he not been right when he scorned 
the working class parties? Had they not really and shamefully 
failed? Perhaps he was more right than one had thought-perhaps 
also in other respects .... Should one not give him the fair chance 
he was asking for? Such were the thoughts that filled the minds of the 
overwhelming majority of the German people by Autumn, 1933. 
The result was the November elections and referendum which came 
as a shock to all anti-Fascists. Of ·the electorate of 45,146,277, 95.2% 
voted in the Reichstag-elections and 96.3% in the referendum. In the 
elections the Nazis received 39,646,273 votes (92.2% of the elector-
ate). 3,349,445 election cards were rendered invalid (7.8%). In the 
referendum 43,460,529 votes were cast, among them 750,282 invalid 
,-otes. Of the remaining one 40,609,243 votes were cast for the Nazis 
and 2,101,004 votes against them. In addition to those who. showed 
enough stamina to refuse Hitler their support, there were certainly a 
great number who-but for the terror-would have either voted 
"NO" or else made their election cards invalid. 
The German Social Democratic press in Prague celebrated the 
election results almost like a triumph: " ... these four millions are 
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not an 'opposition' in the normal sense of the word; they are an army, 
hostile to the system, a nucleus battalion for the coming Socialist 
revolution." ("Four Million German Revolutionaries," Neuer Vor-
waerts, N ovemher 19; 1933.) 
The Communist Party went even further: "The election result . .. 
represents a great victory of ThaeI1l7,ann's Party . ... This army of 
1nillions of brave anti-Fascists confirms the correctness of the state-
ment, made already in October by the Central Committee of the Ger-
man Communist Party, that a new revolutionary Upsu1·ge has begun 
in Germany." ("The Meaning of the Elections of November 12 in 
Germany" ; R undschau, No. 43; N ovemher 17, 1933. Italics in the 
original. ) 
In ·actual fact the time of the N ovemher plebiscite was the final 
demonstration of the decay and destruction of the old German move-
ment. In that month of November, Hitler could dare, for the first 
time, to address German workers inside big factories. For example, 
the speech which he made in the Siemens Works (Berlin) was received 
with stormy applause. 
That this kind of Fascist vict.ory was not to last for a very long 
time, I shall endeavor to show later. At that time, however, there was 
reason for anything but celebration among the anti-Fascists. To the 
people in Germany the fact that the "NO" votes were only 4.9% of 
all votes cast was by no means as impressive as the fact that 95% 
.of all electors had voted "YES" (not counting the 750,000 invalid 
votes). They certainly knew the election terror better than anybody 
else, but they also knew from their own experience that the terror as 
such accounted only for a certain proportion of the "YES" votes. 
3. First Clandestine Organizations 
T HE development described in the previous chapte:- is, how-ever, only one side of 'the picture. While the official parties were visibly breaking down, there 
remained still thousands· and thousands of their former membership 
who not only did not give up their beliefs but were teady and de-
termined to carryon the struggle in spite of the dangers involved. 
Ye't, what were they to do? They lacked all experience, all prepa-
ration for the new kind of w{)rk. They were faced with a completely 
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new political phenomenon which they failed to understand. They did 
not even see how radical were the changes that had taken place. How 
could they work without those organizations which had be€n their 
only force, their only weapon? 'iVho was to guide them after their 
old leaders .had disappeared and so obviously failed? 
They knew no b€tter than to continue their former activities as 
well as they could. The methods and activities were to some degree 
different according to the varying political background of these first 
underground workers. But they had still many things in common 
although they developed independently of each other. 
Common to most of them was the concentration of th€ir activities 
almost exclusively on what may be called mass-propaganda. That is 
to say, they all chalked anti-Fascist slogans on the pavements and 
on the walls; they all printed or duplicated newspapers, periodicals, 
broadsheets, and leaflets which they distributed as widely as ever 
possible. Even the contents of such literature was, on the whole, rather 
uniform. 
To all of them it was obvious that the Hitler government was a 
catastrophe for Germany. And against it they did what they had 
done in the democratic past; they tried to enlighten the people and 
to unmask the Nazis. That was the essence of their propaganda. 
They held firm to the idea that they need only persistently continue 
these activities in order to open the eyes of the German people who 
would then break the spell and chase the Nazis away. 
Yet, unfortunately, the eyes of the German people were not so 
easily opened as these first propagandists seemed to believe. Also 
these initial activities were very largely based on illusions, with the 
consequence that after the November elections the disappointment 
reached even the nuclei of the illegal workers. The Rote Stosstrupp 
(one of the numerous illegal Socialist groups which were formed after 
Hitler had taken over) wrote immediately after the November elec-
tions: "The election result has called forth uncertainty and dis-
couragement here and there among our comrades! We no longer fight 
against a party, but against the whole people; they say. To some 
this fight seems hopeless and they would rather avoid the sacrifices 
which it implies." ("Hitler 'wins'-what next?"; Der Rote Stoss-
trupp, No. 27, Nov. 18, 1933.) 
The disappointment among the ranks of the Rote Stosstrupp was 
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by no means unique. All organizations had similar experiences, for 
the elections were bound to shock those who had based their hopes on 
illusions. 
These illusions expressed themselves not only in the contents of 
their writings but just as much in their methods of work. For a cer-
tain period, there was much talk in the international press of mys-
terious "groups of five" which the Communists more than the rest had 
organized to cheat the Gestapo. The grain of realism in those re-
ports was the simple fact that under Fascism mass meetings cannot 
be held, and that the gathering of even a dozen people may arouse 
the suspicions of the police. Any illegal meetings can therefore take 
place only in private houses Dr flats and should be attended by as 
few people as possible. That was the practice of conspirators through-
out the ages, a practice which the German workers were forced to 
imitate after they had been reduced to the status of conspirators. 
The Communist Party had actually reorganized itself into. such 
groups of five or ten even before Hitler came to power. Unfortunately 
tha t re-organiza tion had been so much advertised and a great part 
of the actual membership was so WEll known-to. enemies as well as 
to friends-that these much talked-of units proved to be quite in-
competent organizational attempts. They could not even have suc-
cessfully withstood a much less cleverly and ruthlessly organized 
police force than the German Gestapo turned out to be. 
The fierce determination of tens of thousands of Communists to 
defy all danger and to carryon at all costs should certainly not be 
underrated. The heroism displayed by many of them will not easily 
find its equal. But by their gross self-delusion, which mistook the 
actual defeat for a "revolutionary upsurge," they were driven to 
such inadequate activities that during that first period they destroyed 
more than they built up. 
I remember particularly vividly one incident in the first days of 
July, 1933: 1 happened to meet in the streets of Berlin a friend of 
mine who was a member of the C.P. We talked for a while and I 
asked him what he was doing these days, whereupon 1 received the 
surprising answer: "I am just going to sell literature" (meaning 
party literature) .-"What do you mean, seUing literature? You 
don"t want to tell me that you go around to strange people offering 
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them Communist' pamphlets for sale?"-"That is exactly what I do 
want to tell you." And he showed me his briefcase, which contained 
about a dozen copies of a pamphlet entitled, "Thaelmann's Thirteen 
Questions to the Social Democratic Workers" which had been pub-
lished long before Hitler and which, even from a Communist point of 
view, was somewhat obsolete and without any meaning in the fifth 
month of Fascist rule. I tried-without success-to convince him of 
the .dangers of his undertaking Which, to my mind, were c-ompletely 
out of proport.ion to the possible effects he might hope to achieve. 
A fortnight later I heard he had been arrested by the secret police. 
Of his further fate I know nothing. 
This incident was typical of the attitude of thousands. The most 
active and most courageous among them were the first victims. One 
set of illegal workers after another disappeared in the cellars of the 
increasingly efficient Gestapo. Each time there remained enough to 
replace them. But still, the third, fifth, tenth, umpteenth group that 
tOook over was noticeably less qualified than the previous ones had 
been. 
The Social Democratic Party developed on ~omewhat different 
lines. It lacked that revolutionary background of the Communists 
just as much as their tradition of extra-parliamentary activities. The 
immediate post-war experiences were too much in the past. In that 
respect they were in a much mOore difficult position than the Com-
munists to cope with the new tasks. Moreover, once the skeleton of 
their organization had disappeared, the democratic structure of the 
party caused it to dissolve itself into a number of rather independent 
groups much more rapidly than the Communist Party which had 
always been a strictly centralized body. 
After the Social Democratic Executive had obviously failed to or-
ganize resistance, these independent groups formed themselves very 
quickly all over Germe,ny. It is not by accident that these first at-
tempts were made chiefly by the younger generation. The groups 
often developed out of no more than a circle of former friends, who 
had in many cases belonged tOo one or other of the oppositional wings 
of the party. Common to them all was an unbroken energy due to 
their youth, which exempted them from the heavy responsibility for 
the past and made it psychologically much easier for them to throw 
off the effects Oof the general shock and depression. 
26 
Many of these first attempts at organization remained purely 
local and anonymous, without affecting anything but their immediate 
surroundings. But even this might have a great effect on the future, " 
provided that they managed to escape the Gestapo. Others attempted 
to create proper organizations with branches in many districts. 
Among these were the Rate Stosstrupp, mentioned above, the Pro-
letarischer Pressedienst and others. 
This does not mean, however, that the elder generation had gone 
over to Hitler. Yet, during that first period, most of them had lost 
all self-confidence and all hope that anything could be done or was 
worth a trial. Nevertheless, many of them maintained their former 
contacts. At night, they used to gather at the old meeting places, in t 
their heer-gardens or cafes. They had nothing to do with under-
ground work. They could be seen by all and everybody whispering 
together, exchanging recollections of better times, telling each other 
of the "horrible fate of this or that comrade, reporting on recent wage 
cuts or on the latest police raids in their street. They were glad to 
keep these contacts, in fact these were their only consolation. They 
were even happy, now and then, to get hold of an illegal leaflet which 
expressed what they felt themselves, or to see the words "Down with 
Fascism" chalked on a wall. But they did not go further and did not 
want to, at least not at that time. 
Slowly and only half-consciously some of them have since made 
their peace with Hitler. Others became again active for the cause of 
Socialism at a later period. However, at that first period they formed 
by their passiveness the army of those millions which enabled Hitler 
to proclaim to the world the support of the entire German people. 
A special importance, also during that first period, was gained 
by some small organizations which stood traditionally between the 
Socialists and the Communists, the S.A.P., the I.S.K., and the K.P.O. 
These organizations benefited from the fact that, in the past, they 
had stood less in the foreground of the political battle than the mass 
organizations. As a result their membership was less known to the 
police. Perhaps even more significant was the fact that, thanks to the 
relatively small part they had previously played in politics, they were 
not held responsible and did not hold themselves responsible for the 
break-down of the movement to the same extent as the mass organ-
izations. That was their great moral asset. Thirdly, they had not 
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developed the wide gap betwe~n a powerful central bureaucracy and 
a more or less passively following rank and file membership that dis-
tinguishes most mass organizations in normal times. Holding them 
together were strictly dogmatic, principles which, in those times of 
general disruption proved firm bonds. In fact, they had all the as-
sets and all the shortcomings of a political sect. This lent them a 
special significance, at a time when the mass movements had been so 
decimated that they, too, were numerically reduced to sects, without 
having the advantage of possessing a corresponding tradition. 
It did not always remain thus. These organizations were later on 
to suffer just a.s much as the rest. They merely escaped very largely 
the first terror waves which were directed in the first place against the 
former working class leaders, officers, and better known members. 
Once the police set out to hunt down the illegal groups, all shared the 
same fate. 
Most of these first attempts at organizing illegal work failed in all 
but one respect: they provided the German movement with legions of 
heroic martyrs who will never be forgotten. Whether Communists or 
Socialists, these first underground workers, with only few exceptions, 
were rounded up by the police, man by man. Thousands were mur-
dered by Hitler's henchmen; the majority are still suffering in the 
prisons and concentration camps which are constantly overcrowded. 
Some managed to escape abroad and most of these have ever since 
been chased from one country to another. Many of these are fighting 
today in the International Brigades in Republican Spain, continu-
ing there the struggle against Fascist oppression which they could 
not complete in their own country. 
There remains to be mentioned one Social Democratic organiza-
tion which, from the beginning, developed on different lines. From the 
title of its first pamphlet published in 1933*, it got the name N eu 
beginnen (New Start). From the outset this organization differed 
from most of the other working class organizations in so far as it 
emphasized the following (and directed its practical work accordingly 
ever since) : 
(1) That the Hitler government was not merely one of the many 
ultra-reactionary governments which would disappear as quickly as 
*Socialism's New Beginning; published in U.S.A. by!..:ague for Industrial Democracy '34. 25C. 
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it came, but that Fascism meant a fundamental transformation with-
in the capitalist society, which for a long time to come would render 
the chances of Socialism exceedingly small. 
• (2) That one of the most important differences between Fascism 
and other reactionary regimes was the fact that the former was 
carried to power by a broad mass movement recruiting its members 
from all sections of society. 
(3) That as long as the stability of the Fascist regime was 
guaranteed by a genuine mass support, anti-Fascist mass propa-
ganda (as carried out by the other groups) would only demand sense-
less sacrifices without achieving any visible results, (propaganda be-
ing incapable of changing the feelings, and only capable of making 
conscious already existing feelings and guiding them in a definite 
direction) . 
(4) That the essential task was to build up a strong and firm or-
. ganiza bon composed of experienced "functionaries" (Funktionaere) , 
well-trained theoretically as well as practically, with contacts in the 
important workshops and possibly in other sections of society. 
(5) That the task of such an organization was essentially that of 
active preparation for times of general crises when the newly awak-
ened spontaneous mass 0ppDsition could and should be co-ordinated 
and guided. 
(6) That for the eventual victory the re-unification of the hostile 
working class sections was an essential prerequisite. Although unity 
had meanwhile becon1e the foremost slogan of most of the clandestine 
organizations, it was essential to do the first practical steps imme-
diately by co-ordinating all militant forces within the frame-work 
of a revived Social Democracy. Despite all its failures in the past, 
millions of German workers continued and would continue to pre-
serve their emotional loyalty to this party, which they had helped 
to build and which in their eyes constitutes the embodiment of work-
ing class tradition. Besides, the democratic structure of the Social 
Democratic Party (as different from the C.P.) would ensure t.he pos-
sibility of a free development of new and progressive ideas. 
(7) That continuity of organized work was of an utmost impor-
tance in order to preserve the tradition and experiences of the work-
ing class movement, which, left to themselves, were bound to fade 
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away; and that therefore an illegal technique had to be consciously 
developed to cope with the extremely thorough and methodical pro-
cedure of the enemy. 
~ome of these ideas have since become common property of most 
groups doing clandestine political work in Germany. At that first 
time, however, they differed vastly from what was generally accepted. 
4. Development of Underground Work 
(I) 
Autwmn, 1933, till June, 1931, 
T o WRITE the history of illegal activity from those first weeks and months until today is not an easy task. After five years the development as a whole appears as a painfully slow pro-
cess of adaptation to the new reality, in which all previous experiences 
were of no help whatsoever. What did exist were certain roman~ic 
ideas taken from an imperfect knowledge of previous illegal periods, 
such as the Socialist movement in Tzarist Russia, the German move-
ment under Bismarck's anti-Socialist laws, and the experiences of 
the international working class movement during the great war. There 
was hardly any knowledge and understanding of the experiences of 
the clandestine struggle in the classical country of Fascism, Italy. 
The German anti-Fascist struggle has therefore (and for other rea-
sons which will be mentioned later) been anything but a clear-cut de-
velopment, and a chart of its trends would show as many ups and 
downs as a weather curve. 
These ups and downs were never accidental. They have been closely 
bound up with the frequently changing mass feelings towards the 
regime which in turn varied with the failure or success of the Nazi 
Government. A greater independence and some degree of continuity 
was achieved by the underground movement only after it had passed 
through years of hard apprenticeship. In other words, those numeric-
ally small cadre organizations, which survived after countless waves 
of persecution, developed a new spirit of self-reliance foreign to the 
shattered remnants of the democratic era. However, the description 
of that phase must wait for a later chapter. 
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The Third Reich started its first winter with the triumph of the 
November plebiscite. But this triumph was not to last very long. 
Economic depression had not been overcome. On the contrary, the 
first effects of an unexperienced administration and the more or less 
foolish attempts at overcoming the inherent difficulties by a series of 
hopeless decrees woke the people slowly from their stupefaction and 
aroused a widespread and ever growing discontent. 
The criticism started first in the middle and upper classes, the" 
working class joining in only at a later stage. Symptoms of the un-
rest during the first winter and early spring of 1933-34 were: (1) the 
sharp outbreak of the church conflict; (2) the friction between the 
army general staff and the Nazi leadership (dismissal of General 
Hammerstein); (3) awakening opposition among responsible cap-
italists (secret meeting in Amsterdam of leading German industrial-
ists and financiers in December, 1933); (4) fresh activities of con-
serva tive and monarchist groups, who seemed to discover anew their 
claim to rule ; (5) difficulties in coping with the Storm Troopers, a 
civil war army, which had developed into a dangerously dissatisfied 
mob without any function once Fascism had secured its victory. 
The recovery of the working class from its defeat took much longer, 
since they had lost more ground than anybody else. Still, by the 
spring of 1934 a revival of labor criticism and of the illegal move-
ment was quite distinct. From that time onwards not only the numer-
ically small groups which had remained active, but also the skilled 
workers in the shops who used to form the nucleus of the free trade 
union movement slowly awoke to an ever-growing criticism of the 
regIme. 
~his revival was due to several factors: (a) In spite of all promises 
unemployment had increased. (b) By spring 1934 real wages had al-
ready dropped by 21.5% (compared with January 30,1933). (c) In 
January, 1934, the "Bill for the Regulation of National Labor" was 
introduced, the legal expression of the already achieved enslavement 
of the German workers. The chief item of that bill was the intro-
duction of the so-called "leader principle" into the workshops, by 
which the employer was appointed as "leader" and the workers as 
"followers." (d) It was finally a political event in another country 
which, almost more than the economic hardship, roused the feelings 
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of the German workers. That was the February rising of the Austrian 
Socialists against the Dollfuss coup d'etat. 
The February fights were watched with strongest excitement every-
. where in Germany. For days we used every free minute to listen into 
the wireless and to search for news in the usually mistrusted German 
press. A number of workers scratched their last pennies together and 
tried to reach the Austrian frontier to join in the fight. Everything 
was over when they arrived. 
It need not be emphasized how great was the disappointment over 
the defeat. But even greater was the satisfaction that the Austrian 
workers had at least actively defended themselves and had lost only 
after a heroic struggle. The bloodshed in Vienna meant for many Ger-
mans the restoration of their faith in the cause of Socialism. "Thus," 
they told themselves, "the defeat of the German movement was, after 
all, not typical. It is not true that all Socialists are cowards. Social-
ists can fight, too; workers can fight, too .... " Vienna proved it to 
them, and their self-confidence grew. 
The growing resentment in all classes of the German people, which 
eventually led to the ill-famed 30th of June, 1934, did not yet find 
any immediate or adequate expression in the clandestine work. This 
still remained miles behind the spontaneous development. 
But better than any descriptive account which I could give, do 
the following impressions illustrate the state of the movement at that 
particular period. They are taken from a report (written in Ger-
many just before the Vienna events) by an exceedingly well-informed 
person who not only enjoyed a longstanding high reputation in the 
old German movement but also today enjoys the confidence of many 
active "illegals" : 
"One year after the collapse the remnants of the old organizations 
are very largely annihilated. That does not mean that they have given 
up their faith or that no more connections exist. But it does mean 
that the movelnent and its activities have been reduced to microscopic 
SIze. 
"The C01nmunist movement seemed to be better prepared and on 
the whole more willing to offer resistance than the rest. They never 
questioned whether to continue their work. Of course, they had trai-
tors among their ranks and men who willingly and quickly made their 
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peace with Hitler at least as many as the other movements had, and 
their illusions as to their own exaggerated significance persisted also 
under the new conditions. 
"For the many tens of thousands who actively worked within the 
ranks of the Communist movement, the effects of these illusions were 
as devastating as those of the reformist sluggishness among the Social 
Democrats. Nothing has relnained resembling a coherent movement. 
The central as well as the district and local headquarters were hunted 
down by the police time and again. 
"The lowest units are the most active ones, the cells and the groups 
of purely local character, the so-called street-cells. They produce 
their own material, write it and duplicate it themselves, distribute it 
themselves and carry it into the houses of their district or to the 
Labor exchange. More and more they restrict their activities to main-
taining contacts only in their closest vicinity. They have had too 
many bitter experiences. It happens frequently that they are caught 
-as recently in the Chausseestrasse in Berlin-when surprise raids 
on the huge working class tenements are made and every single one 
of all the workers present and their wives and children are questioned 
a.nd searched by the Police. 
"Camouflaged as study circles for foreign languages they continue 
their theoretical discussions-usually on an extremely low level-
they seem to have learnt as little as they forgot. Still, they are the 
most advanced part of the old Communist movement, who thus try 
to keep themselves politically alive and to serve the cause. Some are 
more than critical of the official Comintern line, but under the new 
conditions it seems no longer so dangerous to be a critical Com-
munist. 
"Even more bitterly they all complain of the failure of the central 
leadership in regard to organizational problems; e.g., in the case of 
Alfred Kattner, who was to be chief wit.ness for the prosecution in 
the forthcoming Thaelmann trial, it was found out that he had con-
tacts wit.h one of the illegal central headquarters. Two or three head-
quarters with whom he maintained contact were liquidated. Even 
after that he remained in his position until later he was shot. 
"His betrayal of Johnny Scheer (the member of one of the central 
headquarters which were arrested), Steinfurt, and others seriously 
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undermined the morale-nothing is discussed as much among the 
illegal Communists as the spy plague; still, they go on with their 
work. 
"There are instances of great heroism and devotion. A funeral of 
a comrade was attended by many workers. Within hearing of the 
police the widow said at the grave: 'I know you were not shot in an 
attempt to escape.' And a worker said : 'You fell for the workers' 
cause, you shall be revenged.' The police did not intervene-they mere-
ly took photos of a number of those present. . . . 
"Of the former Social Democratic movement it is the youth above 
all who maintain the contacts. Numerically extremely few are left. 
In the borough A. of a big town which used to have an organization 
of several thousand members, there is today a group of eight or nine 
younger party members. They maintain contact with a similar group 
in the neighboring borough B. consisting of only three. For protec-
tion they have joined one of the tolerated charity organizations to 
cover their frequent meetings. They are on the outlook for 'illegals' 
who, they understand, have firmer organizational relationship. Per-
sons who are supposed (rightly or wrongly) to be associated with the 
'illegals' are approached for advice and help. They are looking for 
an experienced instructor who could help them in their study circle 
and whose political views would be 'left of the former Party.' With-
out knowing very much what it is all about this group distributes a 
duplicated broadsheet issued by one of the illegal organizations. This 
typifies the remnant of a formerly strong party organization, its at-
titude, the isolation of the individual, but also the chances to reor-
ganize the best elements, few though they may be in numbers. 
"In another district C. the regular meetings actually take place 
in the fiat of a formerly well known comrade. Here, too, an organiza-
tion once counting thousands of members can now assemble in one 
room. They have many discussions, they are seeking a new way in 
serious political talks among young people conscious of their respon-
sibility and aware of the possible consequences of their actions: con-
centration camp, torture, and even death. . 
"In a third district D. they meet alternatively in several fiats. Here 
they are more careful and therefore count fewer victims from amongst 
them. But they have also refused to distribute material smuggled in 
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from abroad: 'They don't know, anyhow, what conditions in Ger-
many are nowadays; their literature is certainly nol worth the risk of 
our heads.' They learnt also from the sad experiences in their neigh-
boring district E. There a badly organized attempt to recommence 
the work had resulted in many arrests. Among those who were left, 
there followed depression and dejection, characterized by an atmos-
phere of mutual suspicion, general anxiety, fear of spies, and distrust 
of the reliability of the closest friends. You could hear words like: 
'The last arrests have shown that you cannot trust even your oldest 
comrades.' Or, 'It is no use; none of the former comrades will go 
on doing anything.' 
'In the district D. mentioned above, they hold that, today as of 
old, activities can be increased and strengthened by success. But under 
present conditions success means ahove all not to be discovered, to 
expand as fast as one's own forces can 'digest' and not to try doing 
things with which one cannot fully cope and which get out of con-
trol. They think it vital to give to all comrades as much security as 
is humanly possible, to avoid senseless sacrifices, and to assure steady 
progress by careful and successive selection of the best individuals. 
"Many of those who with courage and energy joined in some badly 
organized activities have never recovered from their depression fol-
lowing the arrests of their friends. The mere news that the police 
got hold of a list of names has led many to a complete break-down 
in which some lost their nerves so completely that they even, though 
without malice, betrayed their friends to the Gestapo. 
"The young ones learn quickest of all. A year ago they merely 
kept in contact, met for outings or social evenings and went together 
hiking through the country. In the meanwhile, many of them have 
learnt more than they could have learnt during many years under 
normal conditions. Slowly they are acquiring political maturity and 
organiza tional skill. They are small in numbers compared to the mil-
lions of German youth. But these few are the core of a new generatiotn 
which can defeat Fascism . .. " 
That is the picture of the German movement at the beginning of 
1934 as it presented itself to one who actively took part in it. 
But while the state of the movement did not yet at that time give 
very much ground for optimism, the general resentment in all classes 
continued and increased rapidly. 
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In March the first factory "elections" prescribed in the "Bill For 
rrhe Regulation bf National Labor," took place. The workers had 
the choice of either endorsing or rejecting so-called "councils of con·· 
fidence" proposed by the Nazis for each factory. The "councils of 
confidence" were an institution for keeping up appearances, as if the 
workers still possessed something like a representation of their own, 
such as they had in the shop steward organization which formed part 
and parcel of the Weimar Republic. However, the workers knew the 
difference between shop stewards and enforced Nazi "council of con-
fidence" only too well. Many of the Nazi candidates were rejected. 
Scores of individual reports received from all over the Reich prove 
conclusively that the election figures published later by the Nazi 
press had been simply and crudely falsified from A to Z. 
Nor was the Nazi demonstration on May 1 any more successful. 
A totalitarian regime can on any occasion assemble some ten thou-
sand men and women to march through the streets. What counts is 
whether there are any signs of genuine enthusiasm or not. On May 1, 
1934, that enthusiasm was decidedly lacking. The processions were 
everywhere big enough to impress any superficial observer. The well-
known German skill at organizing impressive demonstrations once 
more celebrated its triumph. But the usual songs were missing; on 
arrival at the meeting places, people started to eat their sandwiches, 
went to sleep or tried to escape as quickly as possible, seeking a way 
through or around those gates into which they had been penned like 
cattle. The workers of many factories had not turned up at all despite 
threats of reprisals, others had escaped on their way. 
In addition, the illegal activities had by then to some extent caught 
up, although they never mobilized more than an extremely small per-
centage of the disgruntled population. Still, for May 1, a large num-
ber of illegal leaflets were prepared and rather widely distributed. 
The distributing agents sometimes discovered ingenious methods: 
A motor cyclist drove at terrific speed through some of the main 
streets "losing" a packet of handbills on his way which were caught 
by the eager crowd. When the police arrived he had long disappeared. 
In one of the big chemical plants packets of such leaflets were some-
how placed before the huge ventilators. When they were turned on in 
the morning they scattered the leaflets all over the workshop. The 
managers could not possibly hope to discover those responsible. One 
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of these attempts during the summer 1934 had a rather amusing se-
quel. One of the "illegals" managed to throw a huge bundle of leaflets 
down from the roof of the big department store K arstadt in Berlin. 
The man succeeded in getting back unnoticed into the store and in 
mingling with the crowd where nobody could find them. The actual 
rain of leaflets on the big Hermannplatz was noticed by so many 
thousands of onlookers and caused so much excitement that Goering 
had the truly ingenious idea of inventing some mysterious "foreign 
airplanes" which had mischievously dropped propaganda material 
to undermine the morale of the German people. 
Most of this material was produced inside Germany by often the 
most primitive means. There were also scores of pamphlets and jour-
nals printed abroad for distribution inside Germany. They were 
printed on very thin paper in very small type and provided with a 
cover designed to fool the police. However, even such neutral titles as 
"How to grow tulips," "'The art of self-shaving," or "Ten useful ex-
ercises for your helath," etc. did not usually succeed in cheating the 
police, for why should anyone bot.her to bring over the German fron-
tiers hundreds of such advertising booklets? That was enough to 
arouse suspicion. Therefore much of this kind of illegal literature 
never arrived at its destination. 
During these summer months of 1934 numerous and often com-
paratively large groups of people joined for the first time the small 
army of clandestine workers. Without having given up their beliefs 
they had still waited passively until the general wave of discontent 
revived their hopes and consequently their energies. Most of them 
during the past year had lost all the contacts they formerly possessed, 
their colleagues and comrades having been either arrested or become 
uncertain. So they tried to take up contacts with the various political 
centers abroad which had in the meantime been formed. Scores of new 
programs for the German revolution were drafted at that time-most 
of them since forgotten. Their value consisted not so much in their 
contents as in the fact that they were evidence of the newly awakened 
initia tive and interest. 
But whilst these activities and political discussions were visibly in-
creasing, the general unrest under the surface of the Nazi State grew 
even more rapidly. It grew, until on the 30th of June, 1934, the crisis 
broke. 
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Action was taken simultaneously in Berlin and Munich against the 
principal leaders of the S.A. (Storm Troops). Hitler personally ar-
rested Roehm, Heines and two group leaders in a country house near 
Munich and had them shot without trial, while in Berlin the action 
was directed by General Goering. Among his victims were General 
Kurt von Schleicher and his wife, who were killed in their fiat, and 
Gregor Strasser (one of the founders of the Nazi party). The official 
explanation of the purge was that the S.A. leaders had been conspir-
ing to bring about the "second Revolution" with the support of a 
foreign power and that Schleicher and other reactionaries had been 
linked up with them. Only after several weeks had elapsed the German 
press was allowed to publish an official list of 77 victims. According 
to unofficial but most careful estimates the number of victims ex-
ceeded one thousand. 
The killing of the former prime minister General von Schleicher, 
of the Storm Troop leader Roehm, and of scores of other Nazi leaaers 
in highest positions aroused not only disgust in Germany and abroad, 
but also provoked much fantastic speculation and sensational proph-
ecy that now the beginning of the end had definitely come. 
It is perhaps not surprising that most of the international press 
misjudged the German development so thoroughly. But one might 
have thought that the anti-Fascist political organizations would have 
known better, being almost exclusively occupied with a detailed ob-
servation of conditions in Germany. With the exception of those few 
who from the beginning had emphasized the need for a truly critical 
analysis and a realistic approach free from damaging illusions, they 
were all as thoroughly misled as t'he foreign journalists. 
The illegal central organ of the Social Democratic Party, printed 
abroad and smuggled into Germany, published after June 30 an ar-
ticle headed "Suicide of the dictatorship," in which they maintained: 
"There can be no doubt that the shots in Munich and Berlin introduce 
the self-destructiou of the dictatorship." (Socialistische Aktion, 
July 12, 1937-original italics.) The next issue of the same paper 
contained this sentence: "The 30th of Jwne is the beginrning of the 
t'nd of National Socialism." (July 29, 1934-original italics.) 
For once, Socialists and Communists agreed completely. The of-
ficial organ of the Comintern, the German edition of the Inprekorr 
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writes about the Roehm purge: "June 30th is the beginning of the 
f::nd of the Fascist dictatorship in its National Socialist form," or: 
"The crisis which broke on June 30th is only another side of the 
revolutionary upsurge of the working, class." ( RU/Tulschau, No. 30, 
July 511934.) 
Unanimity on this question was reached by practically all Ger-
man anti-Fascist organizations. There·were only very few voices ad-
vocating a more realistic estimation of the bloody events and their 
consequences; they were shouted down as pessimists and defeatists. 
Yet, these so-called pessimists turned out to be only more realistic 
than the rest. The events of June 30, far from being the beginning of 
the end, were an acute stage of the growing pains of German Fascism. 
They were not evidence of its decay, but of its overcoming of the 
initial difficulties which were still barring the way to the truly total-
itarian state. After the working clas organizations had been defe,ated 
and annihilated, after the liberal and conservative organizations 'had 
been brought into line and incorporated in the Fascist system, there 
remained one final blow to be dealt to all those ambitious and-ac-
tually 'or potentially-hostile people who might try successfully' to 
challenge Hitler's leadership in times of acute difficulties. Roehm 
and Schleicher were both such personalities, different as their back-
grounds and their aims were. With their removal the way for Hit-
ler's unchallenged rule was paved-until more serious universal crises 
shake the foundation of the reg-ime. 
s. The Development of Underground Work 
(II) 
Swmmer, 1934, till Sprimg, 1936 
T HE two years following the killings of June 30 were charac-terized by two main features which on the surface seemed to contradict each other. One was the series of spectacular vic-
tories of Hitler's foreign policy; the other was the first symptoms 
of a revived class struggle. 
The immediate consequence of the Roehm purge was a strength-
ening of the totalitarian character of the dictatorship. At the same 
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time it suffered a considerable decrease of its mass support. The 
cooling off of the mass support was even visible in the so-called Hind-
enburg elections of August 19, which made Hitler President in addi-
tion to his already assumed title of "Leader and Chancellor of the 
German Reich." The election showed almost twice as many anti-
IIitler votes as in November, 1933. This is not without some sig-
nificance although Fascist elections have usually little value as a 
barometer of the true feelings of the people. 
Throughout the winter, discontent continued, a discontent which 
from that time onwards was never to disappear entirely, and of which 
time and again Goehels and his underlings in the Ministry of Propa-
ganda were forced to take notice in their furious tirades against the 
"grumblers and grousers." 
Economic difficulties and hardships for the workers were steadily 
increasing. Nevertheless the interest of the entire population was 
more and more directed towards a purely political problem :-the 
fight for the Saar Basin. Among sane people there was never any 
doubt as to the result of the Saar plebiscite. But many of the opposi-
tion, many of the "illegals" had pinned their hopes to at least a big 
minority of anti-Hitler votes which would certa-inly have undermined 
the moral prestige of the Nazi government. The 90% pro-German 
election result came rather as a shock to those who had once more 
allowed themselves to be guided by illusions. The German people re-
ceived the results of the elections with an enormous enthusiasm. But 
that enthusiasm was child's play compared to the hectic frenzy which 
broke out after the introduction of general conscription by the Law 
of March 16, 1935. Reports received from all over the Reich agree 
that the general feeling was like that after a long delayed but finally 
glorious victory. 
Enormous as the enthusiasm was on both occasions, it had no last-
ing after-effects. Neither the return of the Saar nor even the general 
conscription changed anything in the everyday life of the majority 
of the German people. And in the long run everyday experiences count 
for considerably more than single outstanding events. It is true that 
the lives of the German youths, who had now to do two and a half 
years' service before getting into any proper job, were obviously 
affected. But then, they were merely the generation to come and not 
the generation which represented the average German citizen. 
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Whilst the spirit of German militarism thus celebrated its long-
awaited resurrection, a new and highly significant development had 
begun under the surface. More and more distinct did the impression 
grow that the period of retreat of the German working class was 
definitely concluded and that the harbingers of a newly awakened 
class consciousness were heralding the first cracks in the rigidness of 
the Facist order. 
Characteristic of that revival was the spontaneous wish for new 
contacts and organizations arising among the workers of all districts 
and in all branches of industry. The small circle~ of former trade 
union or shop steward fellow-workers which had continued some form 
of existence in the workshops, became again active in ridding them-
selves of their enforced isolation and in making contacts with similar 
groups in other districts or factories. In contrast to the political 
groups described above, the active part of this new opposition move-
ment was not the youth, but chiefly the highly skilled workers between 
thirty and fifty who had formerly been the militant nucleus of the 
free trade Unions. They were that stratum of the working class which 
had had the most thorough political and industrial training during 
the republican era of the Reich, and many of them had even taken an 
active part in the movement under the difficult conditions of the great 
war. In hundreds of variations they tried to find ways and means for 
new forms of organizations. They founded burial-clubs (tolerated by 
such employers as were annoyed with the Nazis for one reason or an-
other). They founded technical journals, "to promote a higher 
standard of skilled labor." They went and visited old colleagues with 
whom they had lost touch, talking again of old times, exchanging in-
formation on labor conditions in various industries, on the reactions 
of workErs to wage cuts, longer hours, and the general deterioration 
of their standard of living. Although the various psychological fac-
tors responsible for this rise of activity are hardly measurable, it 
should be mentioned that the revival was expressed among other 
symptoms by a slow recovery of self-respect which was of no small 
consequence. Gradually some of the feelil1:g came back that only they 
themselves-and nobody else-could defend their own interests. 
At that time the clandestine work of the political groups was 
somewhat thrown into the shade by the illegal trade union work, 
as it has been called. This does not mean that the political groups 
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did not take part in it. As a matter of fact, some of them were very 
quick in sensing the new chances, on the development of which the., 
concentrated most of their energy. In addition special trade union 
groups grew up at that time, mostly led by former shop stewards or 
the lower and medium full-time officials of the old free trade unions, 
who had gone back into the workshop. Their activity consisted large-
ly of organizing clandestine groups of "factory-reporters" who ex-
changed regular information on everything concerning their lives 
and their work. A visible sign of the newly aroused labor opposition 
was the factory-elections in April, 1935. The result was even much 
worse for the regime than that of the corresponding elections in 
March, 1934. (As a consequence of the unsatisfactory results these 
factory elections-which, according to the Nazi "Bill For The 
Regulation Of National Labor" should take place every year-were 
hereafter suppressed.) Another symptom of the newly organized ac-
tivities was a decree by the German Labor front issued in May, 1935, 
which says that reports on factories, being the exclusive privilege of 
Labor Front officials, are strictly prohibited to all ordinary workers. 
It may sound somewhat curious that workers with more than three 
generations' experience and training in organization should be mak-
ing such primitive attempts at re-organization as the founding of 
burial-clubs and the like. Primitive as they may be, these attempts at 
organiza tion were the first significant signal after the catastrophe of 
1933. 
From the first day of Hitler's rule onwards, even during the phases 
of his highest triumphs, there was no lack of resentment and hostility 
towards the Nazi regime. It was only the belief, that the discontented 
and hostile masses could themselves ao something in order to over-
throw Fascism, that was remarkably lacking. They used to spend 
many hours in heated discussion, everyone trying to defend his own 
thesis against the other's argument: "Hitler can only be overthrown 
by a lost war." -"One day the army will chase away the Nazis and 
erect a military dictatorship."-"Hitler will fall as a consequence 
of the speedily approaching economic collapse. You can see how 
our country is rapidly falling into absolute and incurable chaos."-
"Goering wi!! try to become the supreme leader himself, in the end 
they will all murder each ot.her, then the system will break down." 
This collection of opinions gives a fair idea of what the anti-Fascists 
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were (and many of them still are) hoping for. The significant change, 
which took place in the beginning of 1935, consisted in the abandon-
ment by the grumbling onlooker of his essentially passive attitude 
in favor of active attempts at re-forging the only weapon of the 
working class: its organization. . 
Hardly visible as were their results, the energy and enthusiasm put 
into these new activities were almost incredible. I remember particu-
larly well the description which a metal worker from the Ruhr district 
gave me of his work in the early summer of 1935. He was still fairly 
young, thirty-two years old; in the past he had been an active or-
ganizer of the Metal Workers' Union in his district. After the break-
down of the movement he retired completely into private life. He felt 
that everything was finished, that it was no good running into danger 
for senseless and futile activities. Not for a moment had his hatred 
of the Nazis died down, but he r'efused to do anything. He purposely 
broke off all contact with his former friends or colleagues. Being 
a highly-skilled worker, he succeeded in finding another job in one 
of the neighboring towns of the thickly populated Ruhr district. 
When I asked him why he wanted to leave his town, he replied: 
"You see, I felt ashamed, ashamed of myself, of my colleaguest of 
the movement. Just couldn't stand it, meeting them daily in the 
workshop, in the street, in all the old places. I simply couldn't stand 
being daily reminded of our humiliation. So I moved, hoping to forget 
more ea~ily among new faces .... " For almost two years this man 
tried to forget. Then he too, was affected by the general movement 
described ahove. One day he aroused himself from his apathetic antag-
onism towards the world and towards himself. I forget which inci-
dent it was that had roused him first. It is of no consequence, anyhow. 
What is important is that he found new hope and that, with hope, his 
initiative came back. From that day onwards he started to look for 
contacts. At first, he did not know what he desired from these con-
tacts. He only felt he had to break his isolation. Sunday after Sun-
day, he took out his bicycle and went into the neighboring towns to 
look up his old friends, his former colleagues and comrades. At first, 
he just talked to them, exchanging experiences and information of 
general interest. Then he found two or three old-timers who, like him-
self, wanted to do something. They agreed that the most important 
thing was first to get an idea of what was going on elsewhere. Did 
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other people feel as they did? Were conditions the same everywhere? 
Maybe there were other people already doing something. Perhaps, 
they could combine forces .... Thus, slowly, these visits changed from 
friendly talks into organized meetings. They drew up lists of the "old 
guard" people who would have remained true to their old principles; 
they drew up lists of important towns, industrial plants, and mines 
in the neighborhood. How could they get into contact with the fac-
tory X? Whom did they know from the old days who was working 
there? They discussed every individual: Was he trustworthy? What 
useful friends did he have? What were his special qualifications? And 
they collected reports from all the workshops and mines where there 
was somebody they trusted. At a later stage, they issued circulars to 
their "reporters" advising them how to avoid suspicion, demonstrat-
Ing what a good report should look like and pointing out the faults in 
a bad one, teaching them the importance of concrete facts, advising 
them how to react to wage cuts, how to vote in the factory elections, 
how to behave on the Nazi May Day celebration .... 
I cannot describe the serious and modest way in which this man 
spoke of his own merits in this work, which deeply impressed me when 
I heard his story. But what he did was no more than what hundreds 
of others did as well. Without a penny to spare, after their tiring 
daily work, conscious every minute of the enormous danger involved, 
these men took on their shoulders a work comparable in certain re-
spects with what the Tolpuddle Martyrs had done a hundred years 
ago; there is however that one important difference in that the p-
pressive system of the Fascist State is truly totalitarian; its methods 
differ as much from those of fonner reactionary regimes as the meth-
ods of warfare at that time differed from a modern war based on 
the latest mechanical equipment and the most devilish chemical in-
ventions. 
Fascism transforms a state into an ultra-modern scientific war ma-
chine, not only in its military but also in its civil functions. It is 
therefore comprehensible that the first inexperienced, and frequent-
ly imprudent, attempts at reviving the class struggle in Germany were 
perhaps bound to fail. They were made at a ,time when the general 
stability of the Nazi regime was not in any way shaken. They them-
selves did not for a moment constitute an immediate political threat 
to German Fascism. They were the first faint signs of the fact that 
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Fascism cannot abolish the class struggle, noisily as it may proclaim 
to have finally established the National Unity of the German people. 
Yet, even this first evidence of the re-a wakened trade unionist class-
consciousness was sufficient to make the Nazis feel very uneasy. The 
consequence was a new systematic wave of terror which annihilated 
practically all of those first attempts by a hopeful new movement. 
Persecution of political suspects has always been part of the daily 
routine work in Nazi Germany. But the thoroughly planned Gestapo 
action on an enormous scale in the summer and autumn of 1935, de-
signed to destroy systematically all the old and new centers of anti-
Fascist activities, went far beyond this . 
. During more than two years of daily practice the German secret 
police had reached a standard of efficiency that hardly has even been 
equalled. Some of its methods have been published by the international 
press. Here are just a few examples: 
(1) A man is caught in an attempt to smuggle illegal literature 
over the German frontier. The confiscated literature is given to a 
numher of Gestapo agents who are former members of some working 
class organization. They take these papers to their former unsus-
pecting friends. Sometimes they simply put the paper or pamphlet 
through the letterbox. Unless the receiver indignantly reports at once 
to the police he is arrested. In this way, not only sympathizers with 
the anti-Fascist cause have been hunted down, but also a number of 
inrufferent people who out of sheer laziness neglect to go to the 
police. 
(2) In a town in Southern Germany a second-hand bookshop was 
opened. Among the cheap books displayed in the window were several 
copies of Maxim Gorki's revolutionary novel: The Mother; a selec-
tion of poems by the German Anarchist Erich Muehsam (who had 
been tortured to death in a Nazi concentrati~n camp), novels by 
Barbusse and similar literature which does not comply with the Nazi 
taste. Every customer who asked for one of these books was ar-
rested. The bookshop had been opened by a Gestapo agent for the 
sole purpose of testing the reaction of the people. 
(3) The so-called Blockwarte (i.e., unpaid Nazi officials in every 
block of flats) must at regular intervals fill in questionnaires about all 
the tenants in their charge. These police questionnaires contain, apart 
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from general remarks, such questions as Former political organiza-
tion of the tenant? Present organization? Which newspaper has he 
subscribed to? How often does he receive visitors and what kind of 
people do they seem to be? Does he get mail or foreign newspapers 
from abroad? Which? How many evenings of the week does he spend 
out of his flat? etc., etc. Thus the police receive a systematic 'collec-
tion of records of everybody's doing and relations. If such a record 
contains anything out of the ordinary, the man or woman in question 
is watched. Then the telephone is tapped; mail opened and read, and 
visits and appointments registered. This systematic procedure fre-
quently puts the police on the track of illegal work. 
(4) A booklet with many photographic illustrations has been dis-
tributed among all members of the police in which a minute description 
is given of all possible places where people might hide illegal litera-
ture. This "guide for house-searches" is completed and revised at fre-
quent intervals in the light of latest discoveries and experiences. 
However, that does not mean that the Gestapo is bound to be 
successful in each case, and that all attempts at resistance are doomed 
to failure even before they have begun. It merely means that the 
methods of clandestine work must reach the same high standard of 
efficiency. This is not only theoretically possible, but it has also been 
successfully achieved by such sections of the underground movement 
as have made conscious efforts in that direction. Obviously there is no 
way of ensuring a hundred per cent safety. Even the most carefully 
organized clandestine work may be found out by the police. However 
t.here is a very wide margin between the inevitable losses suffered with-
out exception by all "illegals" and the irresponsible thoughtlessness, 
practised by some, which needlessly sacrificed thousands of the most 
courageous workers. 
The systematic terror of the year 1935, however, not only hit the 
deficiently organized activities. Literally, not a single organization 
and not a single geographical district proved immune from these 
wholesale persecutions. The mass trials in all industrial centers, the 
complete annihilation of a number of illegal groups, the heavy losses 
sustained by all of them are a result of that systematic police action. 
It can be compared only with the atrocities committed during the 
first mpnths of 1933. But there is one highly significant difference: 
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In 1933, the regime was concerned with annihilating. the last remnants 
of the defeated German labor movement. The wave of terror in 1935 
was the expression of the struggle against new centers of workilng 
class resistance which had formed themselves afresh on account of the 
new conditions. 
The set-back to the movement caused by these large scale prosecu-
tions was terrific. The intimidation of even those who had been spared 
was for some time almost absolute. The after-effects were felt 
throughout the winter. The trials of people arrested in mid-summer, 
1935, often took place as late as spring, 1936. The trials were usual-
ly a second shock to friends still at liberty. Often they learnt only 
then how much the police knew. Some of that knowledge was gained 
as the result of deficient organization; some was the result of spy-
work; some was extorted from the prisoners either by ruse or inhuman 
ill-treatment. And the "illegals" appreciated also that the methods 
of the old Czarist police still held good for the German Gestapo: one 
or two of the already spotted "illegals" are left at liberty so that, 
unaware of being watched, they lead the police to the rest of the 
organiza tion. 
There remains to be mentioned one significant occurrence during 
this period which, though without immediate results, had an impor-
tant bearing on the later development. This event was the change of 
the line of the Communist Party, foreshadowed in the late summer 
days of 1934 and later officially announced at the Seventh World 
Congress of the Comintern in August, 1935. The first practical ex-
pression of that change of line was the co-operation of Socialists and 
Communists in the Saa.r struggle. 
Inside Germany the reactions to the new policy were not unanimous. 
Most of the active Socialists warmly welcomed the Communist turn 
to the united front. Others kept a cool reserve-wondering whether 
the conversion was really honest and not merely another tactical 
move, conceived after the theory of Social Fascism had obviously 
failed to win the Social Democratic workers for the Communist 
Party. Most of the underground Communists were greatly relieved 
and enthusiastic when they heard of the official change. In fact, many 
of them had already abandoned the old sectarian line which was in 
such striking contrast to the facts and therefore utterly unsuited to 
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guide the anti-Fascist activities successfully. But there were also a 
number of Communists who for the past seven years had been so 
thoroughly trained in the abuse of all other working class sections 
and in the contempt for democratic rights and liberties that even 
Fascist reality did not succeed in shaking their original outlook. 
Their reaction to the new policy was one of complete bewilderment. 
Some of them even doubted whether the new United and Popular Front 
policy had really been sanctioned by the Comintern. They were afraid 
of having fallen into the hands of some opposition group which falsely 
claimed authority. However, this type of Communist remained in a 
comparatively small minority; by now, even these may have over-
come their confusion and adapted themselves to the changes that have 
taken place. In this connection it should also be realized that infor-
mation on the new policy reached the illegal movement only slowly 
and by degrees in the way of everything else that the dictatorship 
wants to suppress. But however great the vigilance of the Gestapo and 
however clever its methods, nothing of importance has happened in-
side or outside Germany which has not sooner or later reached the 
eyes and ears of those who really want to know. 
Together with the United Front policy came the so-called "Trojan 
Horse" tactics, which means, according to official Communist inter-
pretations, that "work within all the Fascist mass organizations must 
become the chief method of our work." (Florin in his speech at the 
Seventh World Congress on the "Task of the C.P.G. in the Organi-
zation of the United Front." The Com·mumst International, German 
Edition, No. 17-18, September 20, 1935.) 
These Trojan Horse tactics were based on the fact that the illegal 
antj-Fascist work remained far behind the spontaneous opposition of 
the workers, and could not even hope to catch up with the organiza-
tion of the discontented masses against the Fascist regime. Insisting 
that even under Fascist conditions mass-activities were both vital and 
possible, the Communists argued that. these mass activities could be 
carried on, provided that every legal and semi-legal opportunity was 
seized. The idea of using all legal chances had long been agreed upon 
by all anti-:Fascists. A sharp controversy arose at the point when it 
carne to the pratical interpretation of this formula. 
The Communists maintained that the actual Fascist mass or-
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ganizations, in particular the German Labor Front and the S.A. 
(Storm Troops), were the fortresses into which they had to smuggle 
their Trojan Horse. Nobody denied that resentment was widespread 
in both organizations; in the S.A., because the expected "second revo-
lution" had never come and because the strict order o·f the Fascist 
regime was not exactly to the taste of mercenaries, recruited as a 
civil war. army; in the Labor Front, because of its compulsory charac-
ter, which made it virtually impossible for any worker to stay out-
side it. 
Much opposition arose among all those active in the underground 
movement when the Communist Party Executive appealed to them 
to strive for PO&ts within the Fascist organizations, and then to use 
their newly acquired positions for the defense of working class inter-
est. The most concrete expression of this policy was given on the oc-
casion of the Factory "elections" when the Communist slogan was 
to put forward as many anti-Fascist candidates as possible. Then 
all anti-Fascist candidates were to be endorsed by the workers, and 
all genuine Nazis struck off the list. This actually took place in a 
number of workshops. It often happened that employers chose for 
their lists of candidates former shop stewards and trade unionists 
who enjoyed the confidence of the workers. If they were elected the 
employer could proudly present the Labor Front with a favorable 
election result. 
As was foreseen by many, these "C;ouncils of Confidence" turned 
ou t to be mere tools in the hands of the employer or else of the Nazi 
Labor Front supervisers. \Vhatever a candidate's own secret inten-
tions may have been, as a member of such a councilor as a Labor 
Front official he became objectively a representative of the Fascist 
regime and was completely unable to do anything that was not 
wanted, or at least tolerated, by the Nazis. If any individual dared 
to take his new position seriously, if he tried in any way to improve 
labor conditions or to prevent their deterioration, he was warned that 
this was no part of his work-if he was lucky. In many cases such 
men have been dismissed without notice and frequently even arrested. 
A worker cannot read the mind of his fellow. He cannot look into his 
neighbor's heart and understand the other's motives. Fascism binds 
the tongue of the opposition. The mere fact that an old-timer ac .... 
49 
cepted a post in the Labor Front, joined the S.A., or became a volun-
tary ·candidate on the list for the sham-representation of the workers 
was usually enough to discredit that particular man in their eyes. The 
Labor Front and the S.A. are Fascist organizations, which means 
that they are organs of conscious enslavement and oppression. As 
such they are regarded by the opposition; as such they are hated and 
despised. 
Most of the illegal workers therefore rejected this kind of Trojan 
Horse tactics. They knew, or rather felt instinctively that Fascist 
organizations co?ld never be transformed into organs of the class 
struggle, and that respected and trusted members of the old move-
ment who acted on behalf of these organizations, would merely sup-
port the pretence and the demagogy of the Nazis and would gen-
erally be regarded as traitors. 
Discussions over this problem have continued ever since the Trojan 
Horse policy was advocated by the Communists. They went on even 
amidst the persecutions described above. As far as the factory 
elections were concerned the Nazi Government solved the problem in 
its own way, for in 1936 the factory elections were not allowed to 
take place. They were postponed until 1937. (In 1937 they were 
again postponed, which probably means that they have been abolished 
for good.) But the blows dealt to the illegal movement during the 
year 1935 undid many of the positive effects which the new line would 
otherwise have had on the clandestine work. 
In the spring of 1936, on top of the general depression among the 
"illegals" came another of Hitler's spectacular successes in foreign 
policy:-the march into the Rhineland. In contrast to the general 
conscription introduced in the previous year, which had been ex-
pected, the military occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, 
came as a complete surprise to the German people. Their first reac-
tion was fear-surely the other powers would not idly look on ... 
Surely France would declare war ... They waited-and when nothing 
came but diplomatic protests, their fears changed suddenly into en-
thusiastic triumph. At that time the overwhelming majority of the 
German people felt nothing but admiration for "the great leader who 
by his fearless determination had at last restored Germany's honor 
and freedom." 
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That was the lowest point ever reached by the anti-Fascist oppo-
sition. 
6. The Development of Underground Work 
(III) 
Spring, 1936, till Witnter, 1937 
I N APRIL, so-called general elections were arranged to provide a demonstration of national solidarity with the policy of the Fuehrer. There can be no doubt that in these elections Hitler's 
policy was voluntarily endorsed by many who otherwise regarded 
themselves as conscious anti-Nazis. "vVhy should we not occupy the 
Rhineland? After all, it is our own country."-"In this case Hitler 
is right. Why did the republic never show as much stamina?" Such 
were the feelings widely spread and frequently expressed among the 
working class, too. 
Such an attitude to this and similar issues on the one hand, and 
the failure of resistance to enslavement and the steadily deteriorating 
material situation on the other, caused many observers to conclude 
that the working class had become the main buttress of the Nazi rule 
while the middle classes, who had expressed their discontent much 
more fr.eely, were the true anti-Fascist forces. 
The steady recovery of working class opposition throughout the 
years 1936-37 proves that the contrary is true. But even signs of 
apparent apathy and resignation do not mean that the working class 
has made its peace with Fascism. Through their long political and 
organizational experience the workers have developed a very out-
&poken sense of realism which has never left them. They feel that 
under Fascism there is no chance to form proletarian mass organiza-
tions which in the past always had been and in the future always will 
he their real strength. Unorganized they feel helpless, and it is this 
feeling of impotence which is often mistaken for apathy. The wo~ker 
who for ten, fifteen, or twenty years had taken an active part in 
building up his own organizations would not merely regard them as 
a useful means of protecting his and his fellow-workers' interests. 
The strength and indeed the very existence of these organizations was 
the main source of his pride and his self-respect. It is, therefore, 
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only too natural that the workers should have been far less inclined 
to console themselves with the endless and futile grumbling which was 
at all times so typical of the petit-bourgeois. 
One of the first signs of the new recovery of the anti-Fascist spirit 
was the funeral of the Socialist Clara Bohm-Schuch in the spring 
of 1936. Careful estimates state that about ten thousand men and 
women joined in the funeral procession. Even the Nazis were hardly 
in a position to interfere. Yet, it was obvious to all those who at-
tended or watched that the procession was more than mere homage 
paid to an old comrade and friend-it was an anti-Fascist mass 
demonstra tion in the true sense of the word. 
Such occasions on which real feelings can be expressed without 
grave risks are very rare. But these rare moments were by no means 
the only symptoms of the revived anti-Fascist activities. As early 
as mid-summer of 1936 the depression described in the previous 
cha pter had been overcome. Another phase of revived activities had 
started, distinguished by the display of a greater sense of realism and 
a better adaptation to the changed circumstances than the work had 
ever shown before. Mass-resistance, as described here and there by 
wishful propagandists, it neither was nor is. But it is fairly safe to 
say that the after-effects of the defeat in 1933 and the shock from the 
wholesale persecutions of 1935 have been definitely overcome. The 
same type of worker who in 1935 . took the initiative in th-e work-
shops, the same youths who immediately after the collapse assumed 
responsibility and kept together what had been left of the old or-
ganizations, this nucleus of the new movement again began to become 
active. They had recovered their self-confidence, they were regaining 
their class-consciousness. 
This recovery was due to several factors. The first and most de-
cisive one was the social and material deterioration of the life of the 
working class. The standard of living had continuously gone down. 
The frequent shortage of all kinds of vital foodstuffs, the almost ex-
clusive use of availahle raw materials for either rearmaments or ex-
port-dumping affected the every-day life of each individual. The war 
prepara tion, the accelerated speed of armaments production, the 
cynical speeches of the Nazi leaders emphasizing that guns were more 
important than butter, the increasingly aggressive tone in foreign 
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policy (particularly the campaign against Czechoslovakia) pro-
duced a general atmosphere of nervousness and apprehension such as 
never existed before. 
This was also the period of the first successful effort on the part 
of the international working class movement to resist Fascism. In a 
previous chapter I mentioned that the rising of the Austrian workers 
in February, 1934, had already been a source of encouragement for 
the German anti-Fascist movement. The heroic defense of the Spanish 
workers and peasants affected the German movement in a similar way, 
except that it meant for them infinitely more. The enthusiasm of the 
anti-Fascist German workers for the cause of Spanish freedom was 
enormous. A number of the most active men achieved this time what 
they had tried in vain to do during the Austrian rising-they went to 
Spain and joined the International Brigades. There were few of these, 
of course; and there could not have been many in view of the enormous 
difficulties in getting from Germany to Republican Spain, without a 
penny to spare and frequently without a passport. I know of others 
who over a week-end crossed the Swiss or Czech frontier, sent out by 
their comrades for the sole purpose of getting correct information on 
the progress of the war. Many reports from districts all over the 
Reich tell of numerous collections arranged in factories to raise sol-
idarity funds for Spain. These collections had in some cases astonish-
ing financial results quite apart from their significance as such under 
the present conditions in Germany. 
However vital the encouragement through the Spanish defense was 
and is, the decisive stimulus for the new activities was not in the first 
place derived from international developments but from the difficul-
ties and dangers' within Germany herself. Almost more strongly than 
to the Spanish events did the German workers react to the insolence 
of Herr Ley, leader of the German Labor Front, who in the autumn of 
1936, claimed to have figured out that German workers could make 
a very decent living on 11.80 marks per week. These "Eleven marks-
and-eighty-pfennig" remained for a long time the chief topic in dis-
cussions among workers, and the object of countless bitter jokes. 
Perhaps even more significant is the more efficient and consistent 
character gradually adopted by the organized clandestine activities 
during this period. Since ·the first signs of revival in the summer of 
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1936 until this moment the illegal anti-Fascist movement in Germany 
has made slow but comparatively steady progress. This progress is 
expressed in many ways. Perhaps the most significant phenomenon is 
that in the consciousness of the active "illegals" the traditional split 
has become a thing of the past. Their experiences and their suffer-
ings proved in the long run a common bond, close enough to outweigh 
all traditional antagonism. This does not mean, of course, that dif-
ferences of opinion have ceased to exist. I mentioned previously the 
Trojan Horse tactics as one of those important differences. There 
are others, too. But except for the problems of the method of organ-
ization they are, for the time being, of an almost entirely theoretical 
character. They concern, for example, the problems of a popular 
front against German Fascism. They concern prospects of the Ger-
man anti-Fascist revolution. They concern questions of the ultimate 
goal of that revolution. This does not mean that these problems and 
the variety of possible solutions suggested are of minor significance. 
'rhey certainly are not. But they have not as yet any direct bearing 
on the daily activity of the clandestine groups. Only in rare cases are 
the "illegals" faced with the necessity of making political decisions 
in the true sense of the word. Normally, they have not the choice be-
tween two lines of policy since Fascism prevents them from actively 
pursuing anyone policy. As everyone with only the slightest notion 
of the history of the German labor movement will be able to imagine, 
the existing differences of opinion have little in common with the 
fratricidal antagonism of the past. The aim, at least the immediate 
aim is simple and clear-to overthrow Fascism, and the one and only 
task is to prepare for this revolution. 
Another symptom of the progress made by the illegal movement 
is the improvement of its methods of organization. It is true, the 
standard reached is still far from being perfect; nor is it equal in 
all groups. But to some extent all organizations have made headway. 
'rhis finds its expression, above all, in the development of a higher 
technique of communications between the various local groups and 
betw~en the German centers and the center abroad. (It goes without 
saying that details of this technique are not suitable for publication.) 
It is further expressed by a stricter a pplica tion of more carefully con-
sidered principles in selecting the individual collaborators. It is ex-
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pressed by the refusal, by now common to all organizations, to dis-
tribute, to all and sundry, masses of literature smuggled in from 
abroad-a policy which has proved to be so suicidal that the possible 
good effects could never outweigh the inevitable loss of countless 
valuable and irreplaceable members. In other words, it is expressed in 
a better protection of the individual comrades as well as of the or-
ganizations as a whole, ensuring the vital continuity of the anti-
Fascist work as far as that is humanly possible. 
Finally, but not least in importance, there is a definite improve-
ment in the political qualification of the active cadres of the move-
ment. This again does not apply to all organizations in an equal 
measure. But it is certainly true for many individuals, particularly 
for many of the younger ones. Young fellows who in 1933 were in no 
way outstanding figures, but active and intelligent rank and file mem-
bers of the Socialist or Communist youth movements, have grown 
into responsihle leaders of first quality. Five years of Fascist op-
pression have been a unique school both for character and ability, de-
veloping all the qualities which distinguish a true leader-courage 
without foolhardiness, independence of judgment, consciousness of 
responsibility, the power to face up to reality, energy, and initiative. 
There are not many who have acquired all these qualities. The en-
forced isolation of the individual and the fact that all normal sources 
of objective information have dried up, are bound to lower the general 
intellectual level of the nation. Visitors to Germany, who knew her in 
the days of the Weimar republic, will be struck by the devastating 
effect of Nazi rule in this respect, as in all others. Therefore the 
moral and intellectual maturity of so many of the illegal fighters is 
all the more striking. It has grown solely on their belief, unshaken 
and unshakable by any amount of oppression and terror, that eventu-
ally their cause must be victorious. This belief and their own knowl-
edge of doing what they consider their duty is their only compensa-
tion. Their enforced anonymity robs them even of the recognition 
and acknowledgment with which, in a democratic movement, such 
devotion is generally rewarded. 
They have now learned ways of obtaining information on what is 
happening inside and outside Germany. Obviously, the wireless and 
the foreign press, which gets into the country, play a big part. They 
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have found out that much can also be learned from a regular and 
comparative study of the frequently self-contradictory N ari publica-
tions. On the occasions when they cross the frontiers for meetings 
with their friends abroad, there is, as a rule, an astonishingly small 
amount of news to tell them which they have not already found out 
for themselves. They do not come for information in the first place; 
they come for discussion of their own immediate problems as well as 
of those general ones confronting the international working class 
movement as a whole. 
They are not many, but they are to be found everywhere. Their 
background varies. Some used to belong to the old Socialist move-
ment, some to the Communists, others to small splinter groups, and 
yet others to trade unions only. In the past, they may ha.ve belonged 
to the extreme right or to the extreme left. All these divisions have 
lost their significance. Although the same individuals, they are no 
longer the shattered remnants of defea.ted organizations; they are the 
pioneers-the active nucleus of a new movement. 
7. Problems and Prospects 
T HE slow but steady advance of the clandestine German move-ment since the summer of 1936 should not, however, create the illusion that henceforth serious setbacks need no longer be 
expected. Any day another big terror drive may destroy much of 
what has been slowly built up during the last period. Nobody could 
be more aware of that danger than the "illegals" themselves. Fascism 
can arrest and kill individuals. It can even wipe out whole organiza-
tion. But it cannot conquer the social forces which are the constant 
and inexhaustible source of strength to the illegal movement. 
The careful analysis of such social forces as are created by Fascism 
against itself, or continue to be effective under its rule, must be one 
of the main tasks of the anti-Fascist camp. The history of Fascist 
Italy, the history of Nazi Germany have proved that even decades of 
Socialist education and mass tradition do not ensure immunity from 
victorious Fascist influence and propaganda. Those who rely ex-
clusively on the revolutionary spontaneity of the working masses in 
all circumstances will be satisfied with "enlightening" and "unmask-
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Ing" and with setting examples of heroism. Five years of anti-Fascist 
struggle in Germany and sixteen years of anti-Fascist struggle in 
Italy should be conclusive evidence that the tradition of working class 
Socialism cannot be regarded either as permanent or guaranteed. 
Yet there is a force in every capitalist society which the most 
brutal oppression cannot destroy, namely the tendency of the work-
€:rs to strive for an independent organized representation against the 
power of capital, a tendency based upon their common interest and, 
therefore, on the solidarity of their class. This force is produced by 
capitalism' itself and will not disappear as long as capitalism lasts. 
The tendency towards class representation and towards an organized 
class struggle is frustrated by all ruling classes, but Fascism op-
presses it completely. (Compulsory organizations like the German 
Labor Front merely suggest a legal class organization and serve 
in reality, to prevent its formation.) 
But the very fact that Fascism oppresses the trade unionist tend-
encies of the working class renders these tendencies political. While 
the new t.rade unionism in America, for example, meets with the fierce 
resistance of the industrial magnates, their economic class oppo-
nents, the same tendencies meet in Germany with persecution by the 
state. The denial of the right to combine transforms all practical 
attempts at combina,tion into a political fight for liberty. Tllis rei 
mains true even if the German workers are not conscious of the 
. political character of secret agreements on the speed of production, 
on camouflaged passive resistance to some of the many petty chican-
eries, or on "sleeping strikes" against compulsory Fascist meetings. 
(For workers to fall asleep in a meeting which they were forced 
to attend has proved a very successful common protest against. which 
the Nazis are powerless.) 
Nobody can today foretell when the opportunity for the Gerlllan 
anti-Fascist revolution will come or what character that opportunity 
will assume. It may be a crisis arising out of a lost or long draw:n-
out war, out of a sudden and deep economic slump, or out of a de-
vastating inflation. Or else it may arise out of entirely different cir-
cumstances which, even as possibilities, are not yet discernible. It is 
therefore futile to speculate on the particular grievances which may 
eventually provoke the German people to rise against their oppres-
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sors. Only one thing is certain-the working class will have to de-
velop its independent organization in order to use this opportunity 
and to guide general resentment into the proper channel; this can 
only be done by those who produce the bread, and not by the 
churches, nor by the army, nor by middle-class opposition. 
The bourgeois revolutions in the past have shown that even then 
the bourgeois class did not begin its o~n fight until the "fourth 
(state," the workers, rioted. But today the bourgeois class is much 
more tied to Fascism than it ever was to Absolutism. Its fear of pro-
voking a militant working class movement by its own opposition to 
the Fascist regime has become infinitely stronger since the victory of 
the Russian revolution. The army may have conflicts with the Nazi 
Party, so has the industrialist, so has everybody who does not form 
part of the state machine as such. Yet, they will never challenge the 
reign of Fascism as long as it succeeds in oppressing the rebellious 
class forces of the workers. The German working class will, no doubt, 
have to look for allies in its fight against Fascism among the peasants 
a.nd the middle-classes. But it will never receive its freedom as a gift 
from other classes or outside powers. "The emancipation of the 
working class must be the task of the working class itself." 
However, the experiences of the German labor movement during 
the years 1918 to 1923 are striking evidence that great opportunities 
can pass by. Whether or not a future German revolution can be 
spared a repetition of 1918 will depend on the conscious preparation 
made today. Here lies the significance of the illegal work. The illegal 
organizations are faced with the two-fold task, (1) to co-ordinate 
the still independent work of the numerous groups as well as the 
spontaneous labor resistance where it arises; and (2) to develop a 
determined and capable leadership which through this work of co-
ordination will win the confidence of the anti-Fascist workers. 
Despite its inevitable limitations, despite slow progress, frequent 
set-backs, and the failure to achieve spectacular results, it is the 
illegal anti-Fascist movement which will decide the fate of the Ger-
many of tomorrow. 
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II NEW S FRO M NOW HER E - II 
The League receives several times each month special reports and letters from 
various centers in Europe. These reports relate to specific situations in various 
areas and no one or two of them can be taken as a general picture. The many 
reports do indicate, however, the basis and foundation on which underground 
work must be built and the situation to which it must accommodate itself. 
From voluminous reports each divided into some ten to twenty subdivisions, 
received since April, two excerpts are printed below. They are sections of re-
ports arbitrarily selected as typical of the material received-though the first 
quotation concerns a district in which secret opposition is much greater than in 
most areas. For obvious reasons the names of districts have been omitted. 
FROM A REPORT IN EARLY APRIL 
After the Invasion of Austria-Before the Elections 
Once again the German people are subjected to a propaganda drive on a 
huge scale. The Nazis are trying to substitute enthusiasm .for the fear of war 
which for some days was especially deeply felt among the people. lit is a fact 
that the first period following the latest coup has found some echo among the 
Germans as it remained without any visible serious consequences. They are 
glad that things went as they did and therefore they approve somewhat be-
latedly the "bold act of the Leader." The regime is taking the fullest advantage 
of these feelings. Hence the suddenness of Hitler's departure from Vienna, of his 
summoning of the Reichstag and of the arrangement for new elections. 
The coup d'etat tactics which Hitler is employing demands the complete 
secrecy in all his preparations at home as well as abroad. The effect of surprise 
is however already half the victory in this world of ours shaken as it is by a 
sense of insecurity and fear of war. But the nearer we approach the actual 
outbreak of war, the greater the risk of another surprise action becomes, all the 
more outspoken becomes another phenomenon which is linked up with Hitler's 
"lightening policy," i.e., panic. Such a panic among the people may prove ex-
tremely dangerous for the regime when the war should actually break out. 
In the following we shall give reports from various German districts and 
provinces which illustrate the above statements. 
In one certain frontier district a true war psychosis flared suddenly up during 
the critical days when the local garrison was called up and marching out for 
frontier fortification. During the days of March 1fl-18 the troops were stationed 
in small formations directly at the frontier. Compared with experiences from 
the time of the occupation of the Rhineland it is striking how very much greater 
the fear of war was during the recent decisive days. The unrest and uneasiness 
has moreover, remained much longer after the peaceful conquest and is dis-
appearing much more slowly. Despite the retreat of the troops after March 18th 
the fear of war has not yet disappeared although many are quickly regaining 
their equilibrium and are happy that peace should once more have been pre-
served. . 
The general feeling is that the recent well-prepared and quick troop move-
ments must be regarded as some kind of test for future complication in the 
course of the quarrel with Czechoslovakia. The provisional military frontier 
. occupation and the partial test mobilization le~t deep psychological traces 
within the population. 
In some industrial parts of Southern Germany there was not even that pas-
sive approval noticeable that existed during the period of .the re-occupation of 
the Rhineland. For some months now this district has been characterized by a 
feeling of discontent and opposition such as is inconceivable in other parts 
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of the Reich, especially so in the open form in which the opposition is expressed. 
We received a number of reports which Isound almost incredible to those who 
do not know the special position of this area. Here are but a few examples: 
On March 18th the entire country was ordered to hoist flags to celebrate the 
victory in Austria. In a big flathouse, occupied by twenty-four (mostly petit-
bourgeois) families there was not one single flag. A baker who was requested 
to put out a flag replied that he did not possess a swastika flag and that it was 
hardly worth while to buy one for the short time the whole thing was still to last. 
During the preparations .for the invasion of Austria and their outward expres-
sions like the speeches of Hitler and Schuschnigg, many workers were pinning 
all their hopes to the speedy outbreak of war. All the secret wishes were directed 
towards a military defeat which many regarded as a foregone conclusion. 
(Similar feelings are noticeable in all the districts from which reports reach us.) 
A friend reports a scene which he witnessed and which better than any 
lengthy explanation reveals how deeply engraved in the hearts of the workers is 
the feeling of their suppression. In the washing place of a mine all the colliers 
are assembled and wait their turn to get to the washing basin. They form a long 
queue in the enormous dreary hall and listen to ~he news from the radio. The 
large loudspeakers report the march of the German troops into Austria and the 
non-existence of any attempts to resist. One must have seen these men. No one 
uttered a word. They all looked thoughtfully down. Then, upon the end of the 
news the radio was turned off. With an uncanny suddeness the last tone faded 
out, and then there was silence, a depressing apprehensive silence. There they 
were, hundreds of them, their backs bent, their heads hanging down, motionless 
like in a memorial service, a picture of a silent protest and of despair because 
of betrayed hopes; like a gang of slaves they looked who are torn between 
despair, hatred, and hope. The news of Hitler's latest victory was in this hall 
transformed into a message of broken hopes, of a new terrible defeat. The tri-
umphant boast on the radio and the silent w'Orkers, their faces serious and wor-
ried-that was the illustration of ,the new German reality. 
For the regime this reality is unbearable. Hence its giant efforts to prepare 
the plebiscite with the most thorough organizational and propagandist skill. 
A great many reports illustrate the feverish preparations abundantly. Here we 
shall quote only a few: 
In the Casino X Y Z a meeting of all district Nazi officials took place 
where it was openly said that the result 'Of the plebiscite must be 99% through-
out the district at all cost. It was further announced that 'On the election day 
every voter would get a picture of Hitler. The voter himself learns of this 
honor only on the date of the plebiscite itself. Moreover, he will have to pay 
for the picture. Another announcement of the meeting was the news that the 
construction of the motor highways would start immediately upon the An-
schluss. There need be no fear that time would be lost through the drawing 
up of plans. The plans for the Austrian motor highways were already com-
pleted three m'Onths ago. 
On March 26th there were propaganda meetings in all the industrial plants. 
At the same 'Occasion the managers collected money for election funds. On 
previous occasions such collections taken by the managers had extremely poor 
results. In order to do better this time the managers were accompanied by SS 
men when they marched with their collection boxes through the ranks of the 
assembled workers. 
In the course of the election preparations the Nazis remember once again 
their social propaganda. The German Labour Front summoned a great number 
of works managers who were told that working conditions in the factories must 
be improved under all circumstances. The hustling speed, so it was said, was so 
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great and therefore the number of accidents so enormous that the Labour Front 
leaders felt embarrassed to be forced to report to their superiors on the position 
in their district. These facts did not prevent the same Labour Front speaker 
from pointing to the Four Year Plan in the same breath and from demanding 
greater sacrifices for the Pour Year Plan because of the work for Austria. 
The Labour Front and the Party in this area are now becoming less rest-
less on account of the more and more obvious methods of the opposition to 
guard against denunciation by direct actions of self help. Thus a political Nazi 
leader who had denounced the workers of a certain factory, was attacked the 
same night in the street and thoroughly beaten up. The denouncers have there-
fore become rather reluctant. Cases of rows with the Nazis or even among the 
Nazis are very often reported. 
Amidst all the fast moving events the workers make the best of the radio. 
They are seeking the remotest stations. Wherever there is ·a German word be-
ing spoken on the air in Germany they will get hold of it and know it. We know 
of hard-toiling miners who sit until one o'clock in the morning to hear the 
broadcasts. To the foreigner it may be inconceivable how great the yearning 
of the German man and woman ils to get hold of a single free word. If only the 
foreign broadcasting stations would recognize the value of their broadcasts this 
would be a great success for the cause of right and freedom in Germany. News 
heard in the evenings becomes the spoken newspaper in the mornings. 
The feelings of the German people show at present many variations. In no 
case, however, even now among the most ferocious Nazis, was there anything 
to be felt like the delirious enthusiasm which the Viennese demonstrated to the 
world on the day of Hitler's invasion. The war danger is like a nightmare for 
the whole people. Fear is ·stronger th3J1 any other feeling among the majority. 
The opposition cherishes secret hopes; the Nazi followers are looking on with 
mixed feelings. Large sections of the youth are confident of victory. The profit-
eers of the regime are hoping for further profits. And the leaders continue on 
the road they once started. Thus Germany is heading for war which will be 
more disastrous than any previous one in the history of mankind. 
FROM A REPORT IN LATE JUNE 
Ct Economic Difficulties and Popular Discontent" 
One of -the reasons why the Nazi strategy has gone over to serious war 
preparation is obviously the difficulty that is arising out of the scarcity of 
raw materials. Production is trying to catch up with the number of workers 
(acoording to the last figures, 20 million workers are employed), but the lack 
of raw materials is causing big difficulties. It is not only in industry but also in 
agriculture where bad feed has had serious effects which are only aggravated by 
hoof and mouth disease epidemic. Because of the 13lbor scarcity there have been 
special measures affecting small artisans, which is a terrible extension of what 
has been done all along to deprive these little people of their existence by 
bureaucracy and taxation. The same National Socialism that won millions of 
lower middle class people by promising to deproletarianize Germany, is now 
carrying out a brutal program of forcing them into .the proletariat, which no 
previous government would have dared. The recent anti-semitic outbursts are 
expected to be enough to divert attention from these other unpleasant measures. 
We shall give some reports below showing how the economic difficulties, the 
scarcity of food stuffs and the social readjustments ·have caused discontent. 
A reporter wrote us: "Every day in the factories we experience the scarcity 
of materials. Often repairs on important machines have to be postponed. Orders 
are delayed. Everything is transferred over to the Berlin plant. As far as food 
stuffs are concerned, we all know that first there is a limited quantity of one 
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article, and then of another. In the meanwhile in another place they have an 
oversupply of the same artiCles for a while, though later they will have none 
for weeks. That is what has been happening to the supplies of fresh vegetables 
in the last days. They have an oversupply of some vegetables in A, which just 
can't be bought. at B. In C you can get lettuce and asparagus. But kohlrabe can 
only be bought in B or G. Women with large families who have to run all around 
to get provisions, have found out that it is worked syswmatically. The workers, 
at least the ones who are politically interested, realize that this whole market 
scarcity business is just a symptom of the serious difficulties that Germany is 
encountering." 
Another of our people writes as follows: "The industrial plants are reporting 
quite openly to the Nazi party that they are having .terrible difficulties with 
their workers. It happens particularly with their failure to complete the pre-
scribed amount of work, and this failure ilS blamed exclusively on under-nourish-
ment, particularly on the bad bread. The Nazis make the same complaints, as 
for example in the mines when the opposition workers are holding it up to them 
that they at least should have a better production record and they would like 
to have but they just can't make it. It is very seldom now that even a Nazi 
reports on one of his fellow workers when he complains about the regime or 
about the speed-up on the job. During the last arrests in the coal mines Nazis 
actually warned some of the other workers that they ought to pretend to be sick 
for a few days because they were probably going to be arrested. 
In our district the recent arrests did not have the expected intimidruting ef-
fect. On the contrary the opposition felt that it was even stronger. Some of the 
trade unionists who had not been taking any part in illegal work have come to 
our friends with offers of activity. Actually in the A Band C mines the Nazi 
committee arranged that the men who were arrested should be paid for the time 
they missed as the arrests had been a mistake Qf the Gestapo. The management 
paid the men without making any objections except to request the men to reg-
ister at the local Arbeitsfront. 
In many plants there are disputes among the foremen and lower officials 
because of the decline in production. The management demands that they force 
the workers to speed up and they refuse because the production decline is not 
due to the workers but to their bad nourishment and the scarcity of materials. 
In one plant the foremen went in a body to the administration and refused to 
put the speed-up system into effect because the workers were only rebelling and 
demanding supplementary food as they had once before. Then they complained 
that certain materials, especially replacements for machines were not available, 
and that they often had to wait days for them, and that that naturally slowed 
up production. Since these difficulties sometimes cause a lag of 15 % in pro-
duction, the other departments could not be expected to make up the lost time. 
On the 16th of May, in a certain coal plant, the machine for sorting coal, got 
a broken axle. It was a new machine and the axle had only been installed dur-
ing the Easter holidays. The breakdown. was definitely attributed to inferior 
material, but they couldn't get a new axle and the machine had to stop running 
for four days. They used a makeshift method in order to try to fill the orders 
but the other method caused a loss of 7% in the coal. 
In all of the mines they complain that there are more and more mysterious 
scarcities in necessary material. Interruptions in the work are every day oc-
currences. Often as many as six shifts are disarranged and the workers have to 
wait around either because there are not enough cars to load with coal or be-
cause there are defects in the motors and the parts that have to be replaced 
haven't come. The Nazi workers committees very often say openly in meetings 
that the present situation is untenable, as they must work according to the set 
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production level and production often lags behind as much as fl5 % . 
Every day new courses are introduced and new posters put up telling the 
workers how to save materials, and they urge the workers to try to bring the 
production level up to the prescribed amount. The workers can only laugh at all 
of these efforts and sometimes they write on the placards such statements as 
" We have cannons, do we need production records?" 
There are many accidents in the mines and the workers often have to report 
sick, either in order to get a little rest from the speed-up or because the doctors 
say they are simply exhausted from the tempo of the work. Most of the cases of 
illness show stomach trouble, which is clearly a result of the bad nourishment." 
From another district is reported: 
In one of the large factories the men were asked to work 56 hours as there 
was a rush of orders. Despite the prospect of earning more most of the workers 
were not prepared to take on this extra work, partly because they are embittered 
at the decrease in the rates of pay, and partly because they have made the ex-
perience that what they earn extra is partly set off by the increased deductions. 
The feeling of bitterness at the moment is chiefly directed against the Austrian 
workers who are employed in the factory. They are considered to be the cause 
of the decrease in the rates of pay, and are completely isolated. Similar reports 
are from other places where large numbers of Austrian workers have been taken 
on. At the moment the factories are divided into two camps, not only because 
the Austrians partly do spoil the prices without taking any consideration of the 
other workers, and also for political reasons. The workers say that there are no 
doubt many Nazis among these people and it is therefore better to keep them 
at a distance to be on the safe side. 
Apart from the experiences with the Austrian workers, there exists a real crisis 
atmosphere in the factories despilte the present improvement with regard to 
raw materials and plentiful employment. Every day there are disputes with the 
, masters about wages and treatment, like there were before the conquest of 
Austria. There is nothing left of the three-quarter enthusiasm which was born 
as a result of the relief after the danger of war had passed. 
In a large aeroplane factory the Werkschar had to be disbanded owing to the 
unreliability of its members. A new formation has so far not been possible owing 
to a lack of willingness on the part of the other workers. 
In another large factory the attempt to establish a Factory Sports h,as been 
given up as the Works Sport Leader remained alone every evening. 
Gradually every attempt to remove the tension in the factories by means of 
social gatherings, i.e., by means of the so-called "Works comradeship" is being 
met with mistrust and unwillingness on the part of the workers. "If we had 
decent wages and could buy something decent with the money, we would rather 
look after ourselves, we will gladly give up the 'presents' "-this is the attitude 
of the majority. 
From another district: 
"That the enthusiasm of the people for the regime is steadily declining is 
also seen by the development of the German Work Front. It becomes more 
and more just a 'Kraft durch Freude' organization. Their supposed function, to 
look after the workers socially and legally, fades more and more into the back-
ground. In the factories the Front is not taken seriously any more. The owners 
apply to the Chambers of Commerce and groups of experts for information. 
The employees of the Front do not know anything. One can get the most 
various and contradictory information from them on the question of tariff 
agreement and legal questions. More and more officials are being used for the 
'Kraft durch Freude' which is becoming an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. 
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At the beginning there were many voluntary workers who helped for idealistic 
reasons. Such people are now becoming fewer and fewer, and correspondingly 
more officials are needed. The Front is no longer able to enter up their sub-
scriptions in their own offices. Up till now cashiers collected the money deducted 
from the wages by the Workers direction, and then entered the amounts in 
their central card index system. Now the cashiers bring these cards to the 
works and ask that the works should enter them and then return the cards. 
Which means more work for the Factories." 
"At the moment there is no increased shortage of food. There is a shortage 
of onions still. The quality of the bread changes very often, but has in general 
improved somewhat during the last few weeks. There is no longer such a 
shortage of fat. Butter can be obtained in rations. There is a certain restriction 
on pork. 
The substitute policy in ready-made clothing inc~eases steadily. The attempt 
to make the people believe in the quality of the cellulose cotton is not success-
ful. It is particularly bad for underclothes which have to be boiled. 
The lack of housing becOIp.es more and more noticeable. The housing plan is 
quite insufficient. The rents are very high in relation to the incomes." 
From an agricultural district: 
"The agricultural population of our district is very discontented. The reasons 
for this are various. Whereas last summer some of the farmers quite liked the 
Darre Market regulations, because they had less worry about disposing of 
their produce, the real meaning of this organization is now becoming clear. In 
all branches of agriculture it is seen that this will be a difficult year. The bu-
reaucr3ltic centralization of the markets with their exaggerated centralism, to-
gether with all these officials to whom the farmers are not used, begin to get 
on the farmers' nerves. In addition the farmers, in this district at least, are very 
bitter about the form and course of the ground valu3ltion, which has meant 
increase in taxes. It is also expected that the fodder harvests will be bad. They 
are very worried as to how they will obtain sufficient fodder. There is strong 
opposition to the measures against hoof and mouth disease, above all against 
the slaughter of all the affected cattle, the compensation paid being about 60 
per cent of the estimated value. The result in most cases is a drop in the num-
ber of cattle, which will affect many districts in the long run. The strongest dis-
content is aroused by the measures intended to prevent the spread of the 
di.sease. In the villages affected all social life is at a standstill. Visits of the 
farmers to each other are regarded as, sabotage and can mean arrest and punish-
ment. The arrests do not help any more than do the warnings of the authorities 
to the farmers not to make any difficulties. The farmers say what sense is it to 
lock everything up when the workers go from one village to the other every day. 
"We had the disease before, it is true, but we were never in such a prison as 
now" was the remark of one farmer. 
One of the regulations in Darres plan for saving the farmers is that the milk 
is no longer paid for by quantity, but by fat content, and is paid for by the 
centre that takes it over. The lack of fodder immediately results in a decrease in 
the fat content, and so the bad we3lther and agricultural policy of the govern-
ment are immediately visited on the farmer. The average price of milk is now 
8 or 9 pfennig instead of 13 pfennig per litre, whereas the retail price is still 
28 pfennig. The farmers want to know who pockets the difference. They give the 
answer themselves; the hate of the representatives of the government in the 
village; above all of the Farmer Leader of the place is nearly everywhere. So 
the villages present quite a different picture to that of the official propaganda. 
Under the idyllic quiet and untroubled peace, is concealed the increased dis-
content of a disappointed class which feels it has been cheated. 
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